Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on Framing of Issues

 

Sunday, 28 March 2021

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on framing of issues

 The stage of framing the issues is an important one inasmuch as on that day the scope of the trial is determined by laying the path on which the trial shall proceed excluding diversions and departures therefrom. The date fixed for settlement of issues is, therefore, a date fixed for hearing. The real dispute between the parties is determined, the area of conflict is narrowed and the concave mirror held by the court reflecting the pleadings of the parties pinpoints into issues the disputes on which the two sides differ. The correct decision of civil lis largely depends on correct framing of issues, correctly determining the real points in controversy which need to be decided. The scheme of Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with settlement of issues shows that an issue arises when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by other should form the subject of a distinct issue. An obligation is cast on the court to read the plaint/petition and the written statement/counter, if any, and then determine with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, the material propositions of fact or of law on which the parties are at variance. The issues shall be framed and recorded on which the decision of the case shall depend. The parties and their counsel are bound to assist the court in the process of framing of issues. Duty of the counsel does not belittle the primary obligation cast on the court. It is for the Presiding Judge to exert himself so as to frame sufficiently expressive issues. An omission to frame proper issues may be a ground for remanding the case for retrial subject to prejudice having been shown to have resulted by the omission. The petition may be disposed of at the first hearing if it appears that the parties are not at issue on any material question of law or of fact and the court may at once pronounce the judgment. If the parties are at issue on some questions of law or of fact, the suit or petition shall be fixed for trial calling upon the parties to adduce evidence on issues of fact. The evidence shall be confined to issues and the pleadings. No evidence on controversies not covered by issues and the pleadings, shall normally be admitted, for each party leads evidence in support of issues the burden of proving which lies on him. The object of an issue is to tie down the evidence and arguments and decision to a particular question so that there may be no doubt on what the dispute is. The judgment, then proceeding issue-wise would be able to tell precisely how the dispute was decided.

20. In the case at hand, each one of the corrupt practices alleged by the petitioner and denied by the defendant, should have formed the subject matter of a distinct issue sufficiently expressive of the material proposition of fact and of law arising from the pleadings. Failure to do so has resulted in an utter confusion prevailing throughout the trial and also in the judgment of the High Court as was demonstrated by the learned counsel for the appellant during the hearing of the appeal attacking the findings arrived at by High Court. On some of the points in dispute the High Court has observed that no proof of the said fact (alleged in the petition) was necessary so far as the petitioner is concerned because there was no specific denial of the allegations made or as there was no answer by the defendant to the allegations of the petitioner on points of substance. The contradiction with which the trial and the judgment suffer is writ large. If a material proposition of fact or law alleged in the petition was not denied or was not specifically denied in the written statement within the meaning of Rule 5 of Order 8 of C.P.C. and such tenor of the written statement had persuaded the learned designated Election Judge in forming an opinion (belatedly while writing the judgment) that there was an admission by necessary implication for want of denial or specific denial then there was no need of framing an issue and there was no need for recording of evidence on those issues. Valuable time of the court would have been saved from being wasted in recording evidence on such averments in pleadings as were not in issue for want of traverse, if it was so!

Supreme Court of India

Makhan Lal Bangal vs Manas Bhunia & Ors. on 3 January, 2001

Bench: R.C.Lahoti, S.V.Patil

Equivalent citations: AIR 2001 SC 490, JT 2001 (1) SC 252, 2001 (1) SCALE 11.

Whether Registrar of Birth can correct the Applicant's Surname and Date of Birth in his Birth Certificate

 

Tuesday, 30 March 2021

Whether registrar of birth can correct the applicant's surname and date of birth in his birth certificate?

The petitioner is facing

problem for getting Green Card from the USA Authorities because of the discrepancies in the date of birth and surname appearing in the said register and the other records pointed out above.

7) Rule 11(1) of the said Rules is reproduced below :

“11(1) If it is reported to the Registrar that a clerical

or formal error has been made in the register or if such

error is otherwise noticed by him and if the register is in

the possession, the Registrar shall enquire into the matter

and he is satisfied that any such error has been made, he

shall correct the error (by correcting or cancelling the

entry) as provided in Section 15 and shall send an extract

of the entry showing the error and how it has been

corrected will be communicated to the Deputy Chief

Registrar of Births and Deaths, Maharashtra State, Pune.”

After going through it, we find that the clerical or formal error made in the

register can be corrected by the competent Authority upon the satisfaction

that such error is genuinely occurred. There is no time limit prescribed for making such corrections.

8) In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, the stand taken by respondent

nos.2 and 3 is as under :

“6. It is submitted that the petitioner made an

application 27.02.2020 after obtaining the Birth

Certificate 30.12.2019. It is submitted that on the basis

of application and the record available with the

Corporation, the application of the petitioner was

decided on 24.03.2020. It is submitted that while

deciding the application it is mentioned that correction

in the date of birth cannot be made, however correction

in the surname can be made. It is submitted that the

answering respondent on its own would correct the

typing mistake as regards to the surname of the

petitioner. It is submitted that the date of birth cannot

be changed being a relevant fact as per Section 35 of

the Evidence Act.”

In view of the aforesaid stand taken, we do not find any difficulty in carrying

out the correction in the surname of the petitioner in the said register. So far

as correction in the date of birth is concerned, it is an obvious mistake in

entering the date of birth as 23/1/1954, particularly when the petitioner was

born at 1.30 a.m. in the intervening night of 23/1/1954 and 24/1/1954.

Such obvious mistake, in our view, can be corrected.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

WRIT PETITION STAMP No.9805 OF 2020

Smt. Archana w/o. Prakash Tamhane, Vs The State of Maharashtra,

Coram : R.K. Deshpande And

Pushpa V. Ganediwala, JJ.

Date : 28 th October, 2020 .

ORAL JUDGMENT : (Per : R.K. Deshpande, J.)

Hearing was conducted through Video Conferencing and the

learned Counsels agreed that the audio and visual quality was proper.

2) Rule, returnable forthwith. Ms. H.N. Jaipurkar, learned Assistant

Government Pleader waives service of notice for respondent no.1. Shri Amit

Kukday, learned Counsel waives service of notice for respondent nos.2 and 3

and has filed reply on affidavit. Heard finally by consent of learned

Counsels appearing for the parties.

3) On 6/2/2020, the petitioner applied to the respondent no.3 for

correction of date of birth and surname in the birth register (for short, “said

register”) maintained under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969.

According to the petitioner, her maiden name was Sulochana Laxmanrao

Kotwal, but the surname of her father in the said register is wrongly shown as

Laxman Gajanan `Kotawat’. Similarly, according to her, the date of birth

shown as 23/1/1954 is wrong and it should have been 24/1/1954 – the

reason for such correction being that she was born in the intervening night of

23/1/1954 and 24/1/1954 at 1.30 a.m. This application is rejected by order

dated 24/3/2020 passed by respondent no.3 on the ground that the claim of

the petitioner for change in the date of birth cannot be entertained.

4) The undisputed position is that the date of birth of the petitioner

in the said register is shown as 23/1/1954 and the name of her father is

shown as Laxman Gajanan Kotawat. Relying upon the provisions of Rule

11(1) of the Maharashtra Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 2000 (for short, “said Rules”), it is urged that there is no prohibition for correcting date

of birth in the register. On 23/10/2020, we passed an order as under :

“Issue notice for final disposal of the matter,

returnable on 28.10.2020.

Mrs. H.N. Jaipurkar, learned AGP for

respondent No. 1 and Shri S.M. Puranik, learned counsel

for respondent Nos. 2 & 3, waive notice.

Relying upon Rule 11(1) of the Maharashtra

Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 2000,

(hereinafter referred to as Rules of 2000) reproduced at

page 6 in the petition, Shri Mohgaonkar, learned counsel

for the petitioner has urged that the correction in the

date of birth is also possible. He submits that the

petitioner was born at 1.30 in the intervening night of

23rd and 24th January 1954 and, therefore, the date of

birth entered in the register should have been 24th

January 1954 and not 23rd January 1954. He further

submits that in all other records, the date of birth is

shown as 24th January 1954.

The factual position is that the petitioner was

born at 1.30 A.M. in the intervening night of 23rd & 24th

January 1954. It does not seem to be disputed question

of fact. Prima facie, therefore, the date of birth should

have been shown as 24th January 1954.

The question of competency of the

respondent to change entry in the date of birth after

lapse of so many years needs to be considered, unless

there is a rider of the period during which the application

for correction in the date of birth register is prescribed.

Prima facie, it may be permissible for the respondent

under Rule 11(1) of the Rules of 2000 to carry out such

correction.

Shri Puranik, learned counsel seeks time to

take instructions in the matter.

List the matter on 28.10.2020.”

5) In response to the aforesaid order, the respondent nos.2 and 3

have filed an affidavit taking a stand that relevancy is attached to the public

record under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. As per the guidelines

issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs on 30/6/2015 as

well as the instructions issued by the Government of Maharashtra, Health

Department on 17/11/2015, the date of birth in the said register cannot be

corrected.

6) The most relevant fact that the petitioner was born at 1.30 a.m. in

the intervening night of 23/1/1954 and 24/1/1954 is not in dispute. In the

School leaving certificate issued by M.P. Deo Smruti Lokanchi Shala, Mahal,

Nagpur in the year 1969, the date of birth of the petitioner is shown as

24/1/1954. The same date is incorporated in the certificate issued by the

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary Education. In the service record of the

petitioner in the UCO Bank, the date of birth is shown as 24/1/1954. The

petitioner took voluntary retirement in the year 2000. The two sons of the

petitioner, namely, Abhijeet and Amitabh after completing their education

from Mumbai University are settled down in USA. The petitioner is facing

problem for getting Green Card from the USA Authorities because of the discrepancies in the date of birth and surname appearing in the said register and the other records pointed out above.

7) Rule 11(1) of the said Rules is reproduced below :

“11(1) If it is reported to the Registrar that a clerical

or formal error has been made in the register or if such

error is otherwise noticed by him and if the register is in

the possession, the Registrar shall enquire into the matter

and he is satisfied that any such error has been made, he

shall correct the error (by correcting or cancelling the

entry) as provided in Section 15 and shall send an extract

of the entry showing the error and how it has been

corrected will be communicated to the Deputy Chief

Registrar of Births and Deaths, Maharashtra State, Pune.”

After going through it, we find that the clerical or formal error made in the

register can be corrected by the competent Authority upon the satisfaction

that such error is genuinely occurred. There is no time limit prescribed for

making such corrections.

8) In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, the stand taken by respondent

nos.2 and 3 is as under :

“6. It is submitted that the petitioner made an

application 27.02.2020 after obtaining the Birth

Certificate 30.12.2019. It is submitted that on the basis

of application and the record available with the

Corporation, the application of the petitioner was

decided on 24.03.2020. It is submitted that while

deciding the application it is mentioned that correction

in the date of birth cannot be made, however correction

in the surname can be made. It is submitted that the

answering respondent on its own would correct the

typing mistake as regards to the surname of the

petitioner. It is submitted that the date of birth cannot

be changed being a relevant fact as per Section 35 of

the Evidence Act.”

In view of the aforesaid stand taken, we do not find any difficulty in carrying

out the correction in the surname of the petitioner in the said register. So far

as correction in the date of birth is concerned, it is an obvious mistake in

entering the date of birth as 23/1/1954, particularly when the petitioner was

born at 1.30 a.m. in the intervening night of 23/1/1954 and 24/1/1954.

Such obvious mistake, in our view, can be corrected.

9) In view of above, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned

order dated 24/3/2020 at Annexure “I” to the petition, passed by respondent

no.3 is quashed and set aside. The respondent nos.2 and 3 are directed to

carry out the correction in the register maintained under the Registration of

Births and Deaths Act, 1969 in the date of birth as well as in the surname of

the petitioner. The date of birth of the petitioner be changed from

23/1/1954 to 24/1/1954 and the surname be corrected as “Kotwal” in place

of “Kotawat”. The petitioner be issued fresh birth certificate incorporating the

correction, within a period of one week from today upon deposit of requisite

charges, if any required.

10) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.

Whether The Daughter Can Get A Partition of Ancestral Property by Disowning Relinquishment Deed

 

Friday, 2 April 2021

Whether the daughter can get a partition of ancestral property by disowning relinquishment deed?

 The plaintiffs, while admitting the execution of sale deed Ex.A-2, refute the release deed. The recital in the release deed refers the execution of sale deed Ex.A-2 in respect of 0.91 cents and about the receipt of Rs. 2,32,060/- each by the plaintiffs 1 and 2, as consideration for relinquishing their right in the remaining property, left by their father.{Para 11}

12. Two reasons are mentioned in Ex.A-4 for the cancellation of the release deed Ex.A-3. First, it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. They came to know about it, when they applied for encumbrance certificate. Second, the plaintiffs were not paid the full amount agreed by the defendants 1 to 5. These two reasons found in the deed of cancellation conspicuously not mentioned in the plaint. Further, for the first reason, the plaintiffs have not mentioned the date of their application for E.C (encumbrance certificate) or evidence to show they applied for E.C (encumbrance certificate). For the second reason (i.e.,) short payment of the money agreed, the amount paid and the exact amount unpaid neither pleaded nor proved.

13. By filing the partition suit, the plaintiffs disown their own document namely the release deed Ex.A-4 duly registered and presumed to be an official act performed regularly. If the terms of contract reduced into writing and duly registered is sought to be excluded by oral evidence, the burden is on the plaintiffs to adduce evidence sufficient to exclude the written evidence, as per section 92 of the Evidence Act.

16. Section 91 and section 92 proviso (i) of Indian Evidence Act, clearly lay down the rule when a written evidence could be excluded by oral evidence is permissible. In this case, the due execution of release deed Ex.A-3 is proved through the document and through the attesting witness D.W-2. To disprove it, the plaintiffs have not placed sufficient evidence to establish same was executed by misleading them and the consideration mentioned in the release deed not paid to them.

19. After executing a release deed (Ex.A-3) on 12.07.2006, the plaintiffs had cancelled the said release deed (Ex.A.4) on 17.08.2006 without any notice to the beneficiary of the release deed. Later, without any further relief of declaration in respect of those deeds, the suit for partition filed. When Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, restrains the Courts from entertaining suits filed for mere declaration as to right when the plaintiffs are able to seek further relief, and same omitted to do so. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this Court confirms the decree and judgment of the Additional District Court, Fast Track Court No. V, Coimbatore and dismissed the Appeal with costs.

 In the High Court of Madras

(Before G. Jayachandran, J.)

Tmt. Karuppathal  Vs P. Ponnusamy, (deceased) 

A.S. No. 809 of 2009

Decided on February 17, 2021,

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 677

Whether Tenant Can Acquire Possessory Right in Tenanted Premises under The Oral Agreement of Sale

'

Sunday, 4 April 2021

Whether tenant can acquire possessory right in tenanted premises under the oral agreement of sale?

 I have perused the judgment of the Trial Court. Trial Court has

decreed the suit on the ground that in the written statement the Appellant admitted payment of rental amount from time to time and did not claim that the status of the Appellant was severed as a tenant completely. Even assuming that the Appellant had entered into an agreement to sell for purchasing the suit property from the Respondent and had paid part consideration, at best, the Appellant could rely on the agreement for two purposes i.e. (i) file a suit for specific performance seeking execution of

the sale deed; and (ii) claim protection under Section 53A of the Act. It was also an admitted case that there was no written Agreement to Sell ever executed between the parties and the defence of the Appellant was based on an oral agreement. Based on the amendment to Section 17 of the Registration Act, whereby the Registration of an Agreement to Sell has been made compulsory as well as amendment to Section 53A of the Act

and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the Trial Court concluded that in the absence of a registered Agreement to Sell the Appellant could not claim protection under Section 53A of the Act. Based on the proposition of law laid down in Sudhir Sabharwal vs. Rajesh Pruthi 2014 AIR CC 2850 by this Court that mere Agreement to Sell of immovable property will not terminate the landlord-tenant relationship, the Trial Court was of the view

that no purpose would be served to put the matter to trial and passed the judgment, noting that while there was no admission, however, if thedefendant has no legal defence, then under Order XIV Rule 1(6) CPC, judgment can be straightaway passed.{Para 12}

14. Appellant in the written statement admitted that he was inducted as a tenant in the year 2013 vide a registered lease deed dated 09.09.2013 and also admitted the renewal of the lease till 2015. Appellant, however, set up an oral agreement to sell and also pleaded payment of Rs.30 Lakhs towards part consideration of the sale price.

15. The issue that arises before this Court is as to whether the

Appellant could claim retention of the suit property on the plea of an oral Agreement to Sell.

16. The answer to the above question in my view can only be against the Appellant. The legal position on this aspect is no longer res integra. Section 17 of the Registration Act was amended by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, Act No.48 of 2001, by insertion of Section 1(A) therein and by virtue of the Amendment, registration of an Agreement to Sell has been made compulsory with effect from 24.09.2001. Section 17(1-A) reads as follows:-

“Section (1A). The documents containing contracts

to transfer for consideration, any immovable

property for the purpose of Section 53A of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be

registered if they have been executed on or after the

commencement of the Registration and other

Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such

documents are not registered on or after such

commencement (i.e. w.e.f. 24.09.2001), then, they

shall have no effect for the purposes of the said

Section 53A.”

17. Therefore, a buyer cannot avail the benefit of Section 53A of the Act if the agreement to sell is not registered. When a tenant enters into an agreement to sell for buying the tenanted premises but the agreement to sell is not in conformity with law, the relationship continues as landlord tenant and while the tenant can seek specific performance, but he acquires no right to retain possession, till a sale deed is registered in his favour.

In view of the legal position that “mere agreement

to sell of immovable property does not create any

right in the property save the right to enforce the

said agreement” and in view of the preceding

discussion that “mere agreement of sale will not

terminate landlord- tenant relationship unless there

is specification to that effect in agreement itself”,

this Court is of the view defendant has not right to

occupy the said property.”

18. In Shiv Kumar vs. Sumit Gulati, RSA No.417/2015, decided on 04.12.2015, the Court held that when the defendant claims possession on the basis of an oral agreement to sell, the same cannot be recognized in view of the amended Section 53A of the Act. 

19. Significantly in the present case the relationship between the

parties as landlord-tenant is an admitted position. It is also admitted that the rent of the premises was over Rs.3,500/- as also that the Respondent terminated the lease by sending a notice under Section 106 of the Act. In view of the said position and in the absence of the alleged oral agreement being registered, the Trial Court has rightly passed a decree for recovery of the suit property and no infirmity can be found. The suit is pending on

other reliefs and shall be continued and adjudicated in accordance with law.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 RFA 272/2020 and CM 28819/2020, 28820/2020 and 28818/2020

PRASHANT GOYAL Vs INDRANIL WADHWA .

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Date of decision: 11.11.2020

 

High Courts, Being Constitutional Courts Of Record, Has Inherent Jurisdiction To Recall Their Own Orders: SC

High Courts, Being Constitutional Courts Of Record, Has Inherent Jurisdiction To

Recall Their Own Orders: SC

Dec 6th 2018, 14:38, by Sukriti

ashok kini

“It is clear that these constitutional courts, being courts of record, the jurisdiction to recall their own orders

is inherent by virtue of the fact that they are superior courts of record.”

The Supreme Court has observed that the High Courts, being courts of record, has inherent jurisdiction to recall their

own orders.

In Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai vs. Pratibha Industries Ltd,, the supreme court dealt with the

question on High Court’s power of recall of its orders.

A single bench of the Bombay High court initially ordered appointment of an arbitrator. Later the judge realised that

the agreement had no arbitration clause, and recalled the said order. On appeal by the other party, the Division

bench held that since there is no provision in Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, for any court to review its

own order, the review petition filed before the Single judge was not maintainable.

The Corporation approached the apex court challenging the Division bench order and Senior Advocate Ranjit Kumar,

who appeared for the corporation contended that it is always inherent in a High Court, being a court of record, to

recall its own orders. On the other hand, Senior Advocate Shekhar Naphade, who appeared for the other party,

contended that the Arbitration Act is a self contained Code, and, this being so, it is not possible to look outside the

four corners of the Act to find a review power, even by invoking Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

The bench comprising Justice RF Nariman and Justice MR Shah disagreed with the division bench view and said:

“It is clear that these constitutional courts, being courts of record, the jurisdiction to recall their own orders is inherent

by virtue of the fact that they are superior courts of record. This has been recognized in several of our judgments.”

The bench referred to judgments in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros., Shivdev Singh &

Ors. v. State of Punjab and M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala.

The court also disagreed with the Senior Advocate Naphade’s contention that the Act being a self-contained Code, it

interdicts a review or recall application. It said: “Suffice it to state that having held that there is no arbitration

agreement pursuant to the order dated 27.06.2017, the Act will not apply.”

‘Bona Fide Need’ Can’t Be Doubted If Landlord Does Other Business During Pendency Of Eviction Petition: SC

‘Bona Fide Need’ Can’t Be Doubted If Landlord Does Other Business During Pendency

Of Eviction Petition: SC

Dec 15th 2018, 07:56, by Sukriti

ashok kini

“It would be inappropriate to expect the son of the respondent – landlord to sit idle without doing any work till the eviction petition is decided on the basis of the bona fide requirement.”

The Supreme Court has held that it would be inappropriate to expect that the landowner or his son (for whom the building is required) should sit idle and not to perform any work till the suit for eviction is decided on the basis of bona fide requirement.

In Hukum Chandra vs. Nemi Chand Jain, the landlord had filed suit under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh

Accommodation Control Act, 1961, seeking eviction of the tenant from the suit shop on the ground of bona fide requirement to settle his son. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the son was already doing an independent business of utensils and he was not unemployed.

 The 1st appellate court reversed these findings and held that it would be inappropriate to expect that the landowner should sit idle and not to perform any work till the suit for eviction is decided on the basis of bona fide requirement. The high court also affirmed the findings of the 1st appellate court holding that the landlord has established the bona fide requirement for establishing business for his son.

In the appeal filed by the tenant against high court judgment, the bench comprising Justice R. Banumathi and Justice

Indira Banerjee observed that there is nothing to show that land owner’s son was engaged in the business of utensils at the time of filing of the eviction petition.

Upholding the findings of 1st appellate court and high court, the bench said: “In the present case, mere fact that Rajendra Kumar was involved in the business of utensils – “Rajendra Bartan Bhandar” a bona fide need of the premises cannot be doubted. It would be inappropriate to expect the son of the respondent – landlord to sit idle without doing any work till the eviction petition is decided on the basis of the bona fide requirement. If there is categorical averment by the respondent that the premises are required for his son Rajendra Kumar; engaging in the business of utensils in the meanwhile, cannot be a ground to deny a decree for eviction.”

Dismissing the appeal, the bench granted three months’ time for the tenant to vacate and hand over the possession of the suit property to the land owner.

Read the Judgment Here

Hindu Succession Act , 1956 , Class I heirs includes daughters who are also entitled to the share of property when parents die intestate

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT : DAUGHTERS ALSO ENTITLED TO PROPERTY SHARE IF PARENTS DIE INTESTATE

 Names Posted 23 hour(s) ago 

The Supreme Court bench consisting of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Indu Malhotra noted that as per the 

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT : DAUGHTERS ALSO ENTITLED TO PROPERTY SHARE IF PARENTS DIE INTESTATE

 Names Posted 23 hour(s) ago 

The Supreme Court bench consisting of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Indu Malhotra noted that as per the Hindu Succession Act , 1956 , Class I heirs includes daughters who are also entitled to the share of property when parents die intestate. The court allowed the appeal by the daughter and set aside the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and Trial Courts .

The case was about property share for daughters. But the case began with the filing of suit by son for getting certain properties which fell into his share after partition between father , mother and three sons. Later , four daughters joined in as defendants .

The Trial Court gave decree in favour of the plaintiff son .

Defendant daughter,Maya Prakash Jain , filed a suit before Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division ), Meerut . Then another daughter , Srikanta jain , filed an application before the same court seeking to be a defendant in the said suit which the court dismissed.

Aggrieved , Civil Revision was filed before the High Court of Allahabad where the court dismissed the same.

So, an appeal was filed before the top Court where the court opined :

“On the death of father and mother , if they died intestate , then under the principles of the Hindu Succession Act , every Class I heir including the daughters , would be entitled to a share in the property left behind by their parents .” This is one of the top legal judgments in India.

Read the Judgement

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. The court allowed the appeal by the daughter and set aside the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and Trial Courts .

The case was about property share for daughters. But the case began with the filing of suit by son for getting certain properties which fell into his share after partition between father , mother and three sons. Later , four daughters joined in as defendants .

The Trial Court gave decree in favour of the plaintiff son .

Defendant daughter,Maya Prakash Jain , filed a suit before Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division ), Meerut . Then another daughter , Srikanta jain , filed an application before the same court seeking to be a defendant in the said suit which the court dismissed.

Aggrieved , Civil Revision was filed before the High Court of Allahabad where the court dismissed the same.

So, an appeal was filed before the top Court where the court opined :

“On the death of father and mother , if they died intestate , then under the principles of the Hindu Succession Act , every Class I heir including the daughters , would be entitled to a share in the property left behind by their parents .” This is one of the top legal judgments in India.

Read the Judgement

Note:- We try our level best to avoid any kind of abusive content posted by users. Kindly report to us if you notice any, pathlegal@gmail.com