Showing posts with label property. Show all posts
Showing posts with label property. Show all posts

Friday 15 May 2020

Hindu Succession Act , 1956 , Class I heirs includes daughters who are also entitled to the share of property when parents die intestate



HINDU SUCCESSION ACT : DAUGHTERS ALSO ENTITLED TO PROPERTY SHARE IF PARENTS DIE INTESTATE

Bronze medal Reporter Names Posted 23 hour(s) ago 
Hindu Succession Act : Daughters Also Entitled To Property Share If Parents Die Intestate

The Supreme Court bench consisting of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Indu Malhotra noted that as per the 

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT : DAUGHTERS ALSO ENTITLED TO PROPERTY SHARE IF PARENTS DIE INTESTATE

Bronze medal Reporter Names Posted 23 hour(s) ago 
Hindu Succession Act : Daughters Also Entitled To Property Share If Parents Die Intestate

The Supreme Court bench consisting of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Indu Malhotra noted that as per the Hindu Succession Act , 1956 , Class I heirs includes daughters who are also entitled to the share of property when parents die intestate. The court allowed the appeal by the daughter and set aside the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and Trial Courts .

The case was about property share for daughters. But the case began with the filing of suit by son for getting certain properties which fell into his share after partition between father , mother and three sons. Later , four daughters joined in as defendants .

The Trial Court gave decree in favour of the plaintiff son .

Defendant daughter,Maya Prakash Jain , filed a suit before Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division ), Meerut . Then another daughter , Srikanta jain , filed an application before the same court seeking to be a defendant in the said suit which the court dismissed.

Aggrieved , Civil Revision was filed before the High Court of Allahabad where the court dismissed the same.

So, an appeal was filed before the top Court where the court opined :

On the death of father and mother , if they died intestate , then under the principles of the Hindu Succession Act , every Class I heir including the daughters , would be entitled to a share in the property left behind by their parents .” This is one of the top legal judgments in India.

Read the Judgement


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. The court allowed the appeal by the daughter and set aside the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and Trial Courts .

The case was about property share for daughters. But the case began with the filing of suit by son for getting certain properties which fell into his share after partition between father , mother and three sons. Later , four daughters joined in as defendants .

The Trial Court gave decree in favour of the plaintiff son .

Defendant daughter,Maya Prakash Jain , filed a suit before Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division ), Meerut . Then another daughter , Srikanta jain , filed an application before the same court seeking to be a defendant in the said suit which the court dismissed.

Aggrieved , Civil Revision was filed before the High Court of Allahabad where the court dismissed the same.

So, an appeal was filed before the top Court where the court opined :

On the death of father and mother , if they died intestate , then under the principles of the Hindu Succession Act , every Class I heir including the daughters , would be entitled to a share in the property left behind by their parents .” This is one of the top legal judgments in India.

Read the Judgement


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Sunday 3 May 2020

Good Legal Article on Lis Pendens ( S 52 of Transfer of Property Act)




Good legal article on Lis pendens( S 52 of Transfer of Property Act)





Lis pendens means that nothing new should be introduced in 

pending litigation.

      Where a suit or proceeding is pending between two persons with respect to immovable property and one of the parties thereto sells,or otherwise transfers subject matter of litigation, then transferee will be bound by result of suit or proceeding,whether or not, he had notice of suit or proceeding .This rule is known as the rule of lis pendens. This rule affects the purchaser not because the pending suit or proceeding amounts to notice but because the law does not allow litigants to give to others pending the litigation any right to property in dispute so as to prejudice the other party.
Thus the rule of lis pendens is based on the necessity for final adjudication: It aims at prevention of multiplicity of suits or proceedings.A transaction entered in to during pendency of a suit can not prejudice the interests of a party to suit who is not party to transaction. The object of the rule is to protect one of the parties to a litigation against act of the other.

     The doctrine of lis pendens can not be availed of by the transferor and it is really intended for the protection of the other party, that is the party in the suit other than the transferor.
Suits decreed exparte also falls within the scope of doctrine of lis pendens ,provided they are not collusive.
       Compromise decree also falls within the scope of doctrine of lis pendens, provided compromise is not result of fraud.
The rule of lis pendens does not apply to a transfer by a person who subsequent to transfer is added as a party to the pending suit. A transfer by a person before he is made a party is not affected by rule of lis pendens.
       It may be noted that the effect of the rule of lis pendens is not to invalidate or avoid the transfer,but to make it subject to the result of the litigation. This provision operates even if the transferee pendente lite had no notice of pending suit or proceeding at the time of transfer.
     Its essentials-In order to constitute a lis pendens, the following six elements must be present:
1.There should be a suit or a proceeding.
2.The suit or proceeding must be one in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question.
3.The suit or proceeding must not be a collusive one .
4.The suit or proceeding must be pending.
5. The property directly and specifically in question in the suit must be transferred during such pendency.
Pending litigation-
The pendency continues from the time the plaint is presented to the proper court till it is finally disposed of, and complete satisfaction or discharge of the decree is either obtained or has become unobtainable.
It may be noted here that pendency of suit must be in competent court in India. The reason behind this rule is that in foreign court, not only the procedure, but even the remedy may be different from that prevailing in India.
Bonafide litigation-
The suit or proceeding must not be collusive.
Right to property must be in dispute-
The right to an immovable property must be directly and specifically in issue in the suit or proceeding.This will happen in a suit for specific performance of contract to transfer immovable property.
Transfer during pendency of litigation only-
For the purpose of this doctrine, the transfer must be made only during pendency of suit or proceeding. Naturally there a transfer before the suit will not be affected by lis pendens.It does not matter that the deed is registered after suit is filed, provided it was executed prior to its institution.
The decree of first court does not always put an end to the litigation.Therefore,even after dismissal of a suit,a purchaser is subject to lis pendens if an appeal is thereafter fled. Thus the rule of lis pendens applies to a transfer made after decree of the court but before filing of an appeal.


 In greater Bombay,however it is necessary to register the notice of lis pendens under S 18 of Indian Registration Act. Otherwise a pendency does not affect any transaction.

Important judgments on Lis pendens

Friday 1 May 2020

Mortgagees Right To Sell: Past Situation




Mortgagees Right To Sell: Past Situation
The power of the mortgagee to sell without intervention of the court, before the incorporation of such right under Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was a subject-matter of controversy and divergent views.

This power of sale, a feature of the English mortgage was originally confined to Englishmen or to Indian residents in the Presidency Towns who were conversant with the forms of English mortgage and English law and procedure as administered in the Presidency Towns. In the mofussil, prior to the Transfer of Property Act, there were certain regulations governing the law of mortgages between the parties who were not Europeans. Those regulations did not empower the mortgagee to effect sale of the mortgaged property without the intervention of the court.

Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was modelled on the English Conveyancing Act, 1881 and the English Law of Property Act, 1925. Section 69 was later remodelled by amending Act 20 of 1929 drawing the principles from the English law.

Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 contains five sub-sections. Sub-sections (1) and (2) as detailed hereunder, deal with the circumstances under which the mortgagee's right to exercise the power of sale without the intervention of the court arises. Sub-sections (3) and (4) respectively dwell on the title of the purchaser from the mortgagee and the manner of deployment of sale proceeds of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee, his duties and responsibilities. Sub-section (5) states that nothing in this section applies to powers conferred before the first day of July, 1882.


The right under Section 69 is as much and as full a right as the right of redemption of the mortgagor. The mortgagee is, in no sense, a trustee for the mortgagor in the matter of the power of sale; as he holds it for protection of his interest and for his benefit. The mortgagee is not debarred from exercising the power of sale, even though the mortgagor files a suit for redemption. So long as the mortgage money is not paid or validly tendered, the mortgagee with full knowledge of a pending suit for redemption and even to defeat the suit can enforce his power of sale under this section.

While clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) require that power of sale without intervention of the court must be expressly conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed, no such conditions need be fulfilled, where the mortgage is an English mortgage and neither of the parties is Hindu, Mohammedan or Buddhist or any sect, race etc., as stipulated under clause (a) of sub-section (1).

Power of sale without intervention of court

The words "power of sale" refer to a clause expressly included in the mortgage deed. They mean conveyancing. The expression has not been defined in the Act. It includes all steps which are necessary to be taken in connection with a sale. The law permits the greatest freedom of contract, unless it is expressly taken away. If any party contends that a particular clause restricts, in any way, the power of parties to enter into a contract, the burden rests on him to show that the words prevent an agreement between the parties.

The power of sale, under Section 69, can be exercised only in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). The situation of the property is immaterial in cases falling within clauses (a) and (b).



A mortgagee has no right of sale if there is no default in payment of the mortgage money. There can be default in payment of mortgage money only after it has become due, and not before. In cases, where no time is fixed for payment of the mortgage money, there must be a demand for payment before it can be said that the mortgagor has made a default in payment of the mortgage money. It has been held in Purasawalkam Hindu Janopakara Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. v. Kuddus Sahib that where the amount due for principal is not repayable at any particular date, nor is anything stated as to when it is to be repaid, there can be no default in the payment of the principal sum due until there is a demand made for the money.

Section 69(1) (a)

The first case in which the mortgagee can have the power to sell is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It lays down the following conditions for the acquisition of the power, namely: (1) that the mortgage must be an English mortgage, as defined in Section 58(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and (2) neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee must be-
(i) a Hindu, Mohammedan or Buddhist, or
(ii) a member of any other race, sect, tribe, or class from time to time specified in this behalf by the State Government in the Official Gazette.

The power of sale is inherent in the mortgagee, if Conditions (i) and (ii) mentioned above are satisfied. Thus it can be exercised where an English mortgage is executed by a company, which can be said to have no religion3 In L.V. Apte v. R.G.N. Price, the A.P. High Court applied Section 69 to an English mortgage between a company and trustees for debenture-holders, some of the trustees being Hindus.



Section 69(1) (a) is confined only to a select sect of mortgagors and mortgagees who do not belong to the majority communities in India. This section is taken advantage of by corporate bodies who are not natural persons since such bodies are not deemed to belong to any religion. As far as individuals are concerned, this section can be adopted if both the mortgagor and mortgagee do not belong to the religion, race, sect, tribe or class which are excluded from the purview of Section 69(1) (a).

If the conditions in Section 69(1) (a) and Section 69(2) are complied with, mortgagee's power of sale arises suo motu.

It is opined that Section 69(1) (a) is outdated in the present circumstances since the stipulations cannot be applied to the commercial transactions like mortgages, in letter and spirit. No community can be compelled to exclude themselves from a particular commercial venture as it would affect their constitutional rights.

Sections 69(1) (b) and 69(1) (c)

The words "expressly conferred" in clauses (b) and (c) indicate that the inherent power available under clause (a) is not available under clauses (b) and (c).

To bring a case under Section 69(1) (b), it is necessary to establish that

(i) a power of sale without the intervention of the court is expressly conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed, and
(ii) the mortgagee is Government. This clause is applicable only where the mortgagee is the Government and does not extend to any other person. It applies both to the State Governments and the Central Government.

Section 69(1) (c) requires that

(i) a power of sale without the intervention of the court must have expressly been conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed, and

(ii) the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, must, on the date of the execution of the mortgage deed, have been situate within the towns of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or in any other town, or area, which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.



It is observed that the three cases mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act are independent and mutually exclusive. Clause (a) applies only where the mortgage is an English mortgage and the parties do not belong to certain religions, or sects, etc. Clause (b) applies to cases where the mortgagee is the Government. Under clauses (a) and (b), it is not necessary that the property mortgaged should be situated in any particular place. It may be situated in any part of India. But an essential condition of clause (c) is that the mortgaged property must be situated within any of the towns or area, specified in the clause.

Conditions for exercise of power

Section 69(2) (a) and Section 69(2) (b) specify the conditions for exercise of the power. These conditions are imperative and cannot be varied by an agreement between the parties. The power to exercise the right of sale arises when

(i) (a) notice in writing requiring payment of the principal money has been served on the mortgagor, or on one of several mortgagors, and

(b) default has been made in payment of the principal money, or of part thereof, and

(c) such default has continued for three months after such service; or

(ii) some interest under the mortgage amounting at least to five hundred rupees is (a) in arrear, and (b) remains unpaid for three months after becoming due.



Conditions (i) and (ii) are in the alternative. It is sufficient if any one of them is fulfilled.

The power of sale under Section 69(1) can be exercised by the mortgagee only when the conditions under Section 69(2) are fulfilled.

No notice is necessary when default is made for the payment of interest. It is sufficient that interest under the mortgage amounting at least to five hundred rupees is in arrear and unpaid for three months after becoming due.

Notice cannot be waived

The notice required by Section 69(2) (a) is not only necessary but is imperative and even the period of three months cannot be curtailed by agreement of the parties.

The Supreme Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam held that the conferment of power on mortgagee to sell without intervention of the court in a mortgage deed by itself will not deprive the mortgagor of his right of redemption. The equity of redemption is not extinguished by mere contract for sale. Therefore, until sale is complete by registration the mortgagor does not lose his right of redemption. In view of the fact that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another, it cannot be said that the mortgagor lost the right of redemption just because the property was put to auction. The mortgagor has a right to redeem unless the sale of property was complete by registration in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act.

Section 69(1)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 unduly excludes the majority communities in India from exercising the power of sale available for an English mortgagee. This section appears to have been enacted only for the transactions between mortgagors and mortgagees who are English people or people of English origin.

Section 69(1) (a)a blot on statute

When the debate on uniform civil code in India is hotting up amongst the law-makers and the general public, retention of Section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is a blot on the statute-book. This section is a clear discrimination between religious communities in commercial transactions in India.

Section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has lost its relevance in the present-day secular circumstances. English mortgage is rarely resorted to by the lenders like banks in view of the religious discrimination in the section itself and stamp duty and registration expenses being heavy to be borne by the mortgagors.



It is suggested that an amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act is the need of the hour deleting the portion regarding restriction of the power of sale without intervention of the court only to certain religious communities.

The power of sale under Section 69(1) (c) of the Transfer of Property Act can be exercised only when the mortgaged properties are situated within certain towns. The restriction in respect of location of the properties within certain towns for the purpose of Section 69(1) (c) might have been a carefully considered decision at the time when the section was inserted into the Act. It protects the gullible rural masses from the usurious moneylenders. Since then, the situation has undergone changes and the people in the rural sector are prudent enough to know the implications of mortgage transactions.

Mortgagees Right To Sell: Present Situation

At present, an attempt has been made to change the situation by passing the “Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Act 54 of 2002)”, which protects the interests of the banks and other financial institutions by providing ways to recover their amounts by selling the assets of the mortgagor.

The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, fondly called by bankers as Securitisation Act, has recently been enacted conferring powers on banks and financial institutions, if they are secured creditors, to realize the securities by sale etc., without intervention of court. The Act contains a provision overriding the provision of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the said Act reads as under:

"13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or Section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

The provisions of the Act have been made applicable exclusively to banks and financial institutions as secured creditors to enforce their security interest with a view to recovering their debts. That is, if the banks and financial institutions are secured creditors having lent against securities like mortgage of immovable property, charge, hypothecation they can take over and sell such securities after giving 60 days' notice to the borrowers so as to adjust the loan, without resort to litigation in a competent court of law. The provisions of the Act cannot be considered to have been extended to the secured creditors in general. In a nutshell, the provisions of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 can be ignored by the banks and financial institutions in the matter of recovery of their debts ex curia whereas other creditors have to file a suit in a competent court for recovery of the loan. Otherwise, Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 still remains on the statute and is applicable to other creditors who are not banks and financial institutions. The banks and financial institutions are empowered to short-circuit the legal process to enforce the securities for recovery of their loans while the other creditors such as individuals, association of persons have to undergo the rigmorale of court proceedings. This is a clear discrimination endowing one section with legal favouritism and depriving similarly placed others of such right. Hence the suggestion for the amendment to make the law uniform to all creditors who have lent against mortgage securities.

It is suggested that the stipulation of certain notified towns in Section 69(1) (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 should be deleted by an amendment since such a stipulation does not have any sanctity or reasonable purpose in the present circumstances.

Recourse to legal proceedings through a court of law for recovery of debts, though secured by mortgage, is not only time-consuming but expensive too. The suggested amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 will result in enforcement of mortgage security by the mortgagee without resort to court proceedings and will, to some extent, disburden the courts from the current scenario of docket explosion so that the other cases can be adjudicated as expeditiously as possible.

Conclusion
After going through this project, I have come to the conclusion that, section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has lost its relevance in the present-day secular circumstances. English mortgage is rarely resorted to by the lenders like banks in view of the religious discrimination in the section itself and stamp duty and registration expenses being heavy to be borne by the mortgagors.

This is because, section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 unduly excludes the majority communities in India from exercising the power of sale available for an English mortgagee. This section appears to have been enacted only for the transactions between mortgagors and mortgagees who are English people or people of English origin.

Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that an amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act is the need of the hour, deleting the portion regarding restriction of the power of sale without intervention of the court only to certain religious communities.


Further, as regards the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 is concerned, there is a clear discrimination endowing one section with legal favouritism and depriving similarly placed others of such right. Hence I would suggest for the amendment to make the law uniform to all creditors who have lent against mortgage securities. This is because this Act is applicable only to banks and financial institutions and not to other types of creditors.

Further, recourse to legal proceedings through a court of law for recovery of debts, though secured by mortgage, is not only time-consuming but expensive too. The suggested amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 will result in enforcement of mortgage security by the mortgagee without resort to court proceedings and will, to some extent, disburden the courts from the current scenario of docket explosion so that the other cases can be adjudicated as expeditiously as possible.

Therefore, in my view there is an urgent need to amend the provisions of sec.69 of the "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", so that the interest of the secured creditors can be realized more fruitfully and without much delay and harassment.

The author can be reached at: rks_nlu@legalserviceindia.com / Print This Article

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Wednesday 29 April 2020

Whether a Person who Contributed Money in Purchase of the Immovable Property can Retain its Possession




Whether a person who has contributed money in the purchase of the immovable property can retain its possession?

A contributor to the purchase consideration for immovable property, only has rights if any, to recover the said purchase consideration from the purchaser and does not acquire any rights in the immovable property or any right to retain possession thereof. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 2585/2012

Decided On: 24.01.2013

 K.L. Garg   Vs.  Rajesh Garg and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/0321/2013



1. The plaintiff has instituted this suit for recovery of possession of a portion consisting of two bedrooms, common drawing-dining, kitchen and bathroom of flat on the second floor of property No. 21/13, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi and for mesne profits/damages for use and occupation. It is the case of the plaintiff, that he is the owner of the said flat vide registered Sale Deed dated 18th October, 2004 copy whereof is filed along with the plaint; that the defendants no. 1 to 4 are the son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff on account of the said relationship had allowed the defendants to reside with him in the said flat; however the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants has soured and the plaintiff does not want the defendants to reside in his flat and though called upon the defendants to vacate the same, the defendants failed to do so. Summons of the suit and notice of the application for interim relief to restrain the defendants from parting with the possession of the said flat to any other person were issued though no interim relief granted.

2. The defendants have filed the written statement pleading, that the suit has been filed merely to harass them; that no cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff against the defendants; that the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and has concocted the story of the defendants ill treating or harassing the plaintiff; that the defendants no. 1 and 2 had contributed to the purchase consideration of the flat and the defendant no. 1 also used to pay the electricity bills of the said flat; that the plaintiff is a habitual litigant and had also lodged a complaint against another son namely Shri Pankaj Garg and with whom he subsequently compromised; that similarly earlier disputes had arisen between the plaintiff and the defendants and which have subsequently been compromised; that the suit is undervalued; that in fact the defendants had started living in the flat only at the instance of the plaintiff and that the defendants are looking after and caring for the plaintiff. The defendants however do not dispute the receipt of legal notice from the plaintiff demanding possession but allege the same to be false.

3. The suit was listed on 14th January, 2013 when finding that the defence of the defendants in the written statement of having contributed to the purchase consideration of the said flat while admitting the Title Deed with respect thereto to be in the name of the plaintiff only did not constitute any defence in law to the claim of the plaintiff for possession, the counsel for the defendants was asked to argue. On his request the matter was adjourned to today.

4. The counsel for the defendants, who states that he is the new counsel though has filed his Vakalatnama, has argued that the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands. He has drawn attention to para 4 of the plaint and contended that the plaintiff has falsely stated that the defendants had harassed the deceased wife of the plaintiff. It is argued that the relationship of the defendants with the deceased wife of the plaintiff, being the mother of the defendant no. 1 and mother-in-law of the defendant no. 2 was very good.

5. It has been enquired from the counsel for the defendants as to whether the said argument even if were to be accepted constitutes a defence to a suit for possession; a decree for suit for possession is not a discretionary one; if the plaintiff is found entitled to possession of a property, relief cannot be denied to him/her merely because he may have on some other aspects not relatable to possession, lied.

6. No reply is forthcoming.

7. This argument, also does not constitute any defence to the claim for possession.

8. Though the defendants have not filed any documents whatsoever, the counsel for the defendants has during the course of hearing handed over photocopy of a letter purported to be written by the plaintiff to the Editor of Veer Arjun Newspaper on 19th December, 2003 withdrawing the earlier advertisement disinheriting the defendants and stating "Shri Rajesh Garg and my grand children has full legal rights for moveable/immoveable property stands in my name i.e. K.L. Garg". A right in the property, on the basis of the said document is claimed.

9. The said document is taken on record.

10. Even though the procedure adopted by the defendants of handing document across the bar is not in consonance with the prescribed procedure but I am afraid even the said document does not show that the defendants have any right to retain possession of the flat aforesaid. All that the said document purports to do is to recall the earlier notice disinheriting the defendants. However, such inheritance can happen only on the demise of the plaintiff and not prior thereto.

11. A contributor to the purchase consideration for immovable property, only has rights if any, to recover the said purchase consideration from the purchaser and does not acquire any rights in the immovable property or any right to retain possession thereof. The only defence thus raised in the written statement is not a material one so as to invite framing of an issue and the plaintiff has become entitled to a decree for possession and mesne profits.

12. The dispute raised in the written statement of under valuation of the suit is a vexatious one, bereft of any particulars. Nothing is stated, as to on the basis of which sale/purchase transaction, the valuation given by the plaintiff is incorrect.

13. Faced with the aforesaid, the counsel for the defendants states that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was entered into between all the family members and the original thereof is in the custody of the plaintiff though a copy thereof is in the custody of the sister of the defendant no. 1 and who is out of station and owing whereto the counsel could not bring the said MoU to the Court today.

14. There is no plea also in the written statement to the said effect.

15. The counsel for the defendants then seeks adjournment by seven days to amend the written statement.

16. The aforesaid request cannot be entertained. Suits cannot be kept pending after they have been heard and to allow parties to amend their pleadings.

17. The suit is thus decreed for possession in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants no. 1 and 2 for possession of flat aforesaid on the second floor of property No. 21/13, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. As per Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Chandramaul MANU/SC/0335/1965 : AIR 1966 SC 735 and R.S. Maddanappa Vs. Chandramma MANU/SC/0356/1965 : AIR 1965 SC 1812, a decree for mesne profits follows a decree for possession. However an inquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 has to be held to determine the rate of mesne profits. Considering the nature of the dispute, it is not deemed appropriate at this stage to order such inquiry in as much as the suit has been decreed within six months of institution thereof. Liberty is however given to the plaintiff to apply for such inquiry if the defendants no. 1 and 2 resist the execution of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to costs equivalent only to court fee of Rs. 25,785/- paid on the plaint. Decree is confined against defendants no. 1 and 2 since the defendants No. 3 and 4 are minors and no steps were taken for appointment of their guardian. The decree sheet be drawn up.

18. The counsel for the defendants at this stage states that he has instructions from the defendants to state that they are willing to give an undertaking to vacate the said flat after the examination of the children (defendants no. 3 and 4) scheduled in March-April, 2013 are over. Liberty is granted to the defendants No. 1 and 2 to file affidavits of undertaking to the said effect and on filing whereof this request shall be considered.

An ‘Aggrieved’ Third Party Can File Review Petition, Holds SC

An ‘Aggrieved’ Third Party Can File Review Petition, Holds SC [Read Judgement]
Nov 28th 2018, 12:16, by Rashid M A

Ashok Kini

“We have no hesitation in enunciating that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person, may take recourse to the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the person should be aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in some respect.”

The Supreme Court has observed that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person may take recourse to the remedy of review petition.

The bench comprising Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice AM Khanwilkar observed thus while disposing a review petition filed by Union of India against a 2011 judgment in National Textile Corporation Ltd. Versus Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad.

The Supreme Court in 2011 had confirmed the decree of eviction passed against National Textiles Corporation in favour of Trustees of Seth Harichand Rupchand Charitable Trust. Union of India was not party to the said proceedings.

The contention taken by the Union of India was that Validation Act of 2014 has completely altered the status of the parties retrospectively qua the suit property with effect from 1st April, 1994 by a legal fiction, as a result of which the cause of action against NTC as referred to in the subject suit had become nonexistent; and including any decree or order passed against NTC or for that matter, an undertaking filed by NTC in any court or tribunal or authority has been rendered unenforceable by operation of law and cannot be continued or taken forward.

Answering the question of locus of a third party to the proceedings to file a review petition, the bench said: “Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”) which, inter alia, postulates that “any person considering himself aggrieved” would have locus to file a review petition. Order XLVII of CPC restates the position that any person considering himself aggrieved can file a review petition. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court exercises review jurisdiction by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution which predicates that the Supreme Court shall have the power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it. Besides, the Supreme Court has framed Rules to govern review petitions. Notably, neither Order XLVII of CPC nor Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Therefore, we have no hesitation in enunciating that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person, may take recourse to the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the person should be aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in some respect. “

The bench then considered and disposed the review petition with liberty to the Trust to pursue other appropriate legal remedy as per law. It said: “We hold that as per the amended Section 3 of the 1995 Act w.e.f. 1st April, 1994, by operation of law the statutory or protected tenancy rights of Podar Mills Ltd. in respect of the suit property stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government and it continues to so vest in it and that the decree against NTC including the undertaking given by NTC has been rendered unenforceable by a legal fiction. As a result, the Trust being the landlord is obliged to take recourse to remedy against the Central Government (Union of India) to get back possession of the suit property, as per the dispensation specified in the concerned Rent Legislation, if it so desires. It is open to the respondents (Trust) to challenge the validity of the Validation Act 2014, if they so desire.”

Read Judgment 


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