Showing posts with label Appeal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Appeal. Show all posts

Friday 1 May 2020

Whether Appeal can be Converted into Revision and Revision can be Converted into Appeal




Friday, 1 May 2020

Whether appeal can be converted into revision and revision can be converted into appeal?

It may be mentioned that the Apex Court while considering the question of conversion of revision into second appeal has considered the question that revision can be converted into second appeal, if substantial question of law arise in the case. However, while converting appeal into revision, question of substantial question of law will not arise. It is true I that scope of appeal and revision is different, but the Courts have been permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. Therefore, rigid view that appeal cannot be converted into revision or vice versa will not be in the interest of justice. A litigant cannot be penalised on account of technical error or mistake committed by the counsel. To meet the ends of justice, revision can be converted into appeal or appeal can be converted into revision while exercising the discretion and if the following norms are fulfilled, then normally order of conversion of revision in to appeal or appeal into revision should be passed :

(i) When revision is converted into second appeal, then before passing the order of conversion, it is to be considered whether substantial question of law arises in the said case, if no substantial question of law arises in the case, revision cannot be converted into second appeal.
(ii) Revision can be converted into appeal if same is filed within time and there is no impediment of limitation. Limitation must be construed from the date of filing of the revision petition or appeal. If the revision or appeal so filed was within limitation, for conversion into appeal or revision, it is to be examined that the appeal or revision, as the case may be, so filed, on the date of institution, was within the limitation and if so, said permission can be granted.

(iii) There is no period of limitation for applying such conversion, but while exercising the powers of conversion, the Court would keep in mind whether appeal or revision, as the case may be, had been instituted within the period prescribed for such proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Civil Revision No. 1259 of 1999

Decided On: 25.08.2004

Om Prakash  Vs.  Dwarka Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.S. Jha and A.K. Gohil, JJ.



 In this revision, an application I. A. 3963/03 is filed by the petitioners for converting this revision into miscellaneous appeal under Order XLIII, Rule l(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was opposed by the respondents inter alia contending that the scope of appeal is different from the scope of revision, and therefore, application and revision be dismissed. Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Munnilal MANU/MP/0515/2002, whereas counsel for the petitioners has referred to the decision of the single Bench of this Court in the case of Shivkumar v. Ramkatori MANU/MP/0144/1976 : (1977 JLJ 33).Since two conflicting views were brought to the notice of the single Bench, single Bench has referred the dispute for decision in accordance with law by the Division Bench.

Question involved in the case is whether revision can be converted into appeal and vice versa.

Counsel for the petitioners submitted that this question has been settled long back and this Court time and again is permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. While delivering the later judgment in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) single Bench has not considered the previous judgments on this subject and ignored the principle of stare decisis. Long settled view has been upset in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra). He submitted that against the order of remand by the Additional District Judge, counsel was of the opinion that order was in exercise of inherent powers by the first appellate Court, therefore, revision was filed, however, on the objection of the respondents, counsel for the petitioners minutely examined the position and found that the order is appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, referred to as the "Code"). Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that the judgment in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) has not laid down the correct law and single Bench has not considered the previous judgments on the point. In support of his contention, counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment in the case of Reliable Water Supply Service of India v. Union of India (1971 SC 2183). This case relates to dispute under the Arbitration Act. Though the dispute was within the ambit of Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, but the trial Court treated the dispute under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act. Thereafter, against the order passed by the trial Court, Union of India filed an appeal in the High Court. Appeal was contested on various grounds and one of the grounds was that appeal was not maintainable. High Court accepted the contention and converted the appeal into revision under Section 115 of the Code and decided the case exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Thereafter, objection was raised that appeal could not be converted into revision. It is held in this case that the High Court was right in converting the appeal into revision.

Counsel for the petitioners submitted this Court has taken; a view that even the revision can be heard :as an appeal or appeal can be heard as a revision and relied upon the judgments in the cases of Gauri Shankar v. Firm Dulichand Laxminarayan MANU/MP/0059/1959. Similar view was taken in the case of Rashid Khatoon v. Abdul Rashid Khan MANU/MP/0171/1966 : (1969 MPLJ 587) and Sir Madhaorao Ganesh Deshpande v. Keshao Gajanan Huddar (AIR 1941 Nag 304). Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the law laid down in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) has not considered the previous judgments of this Court and is against the settled principles of law laid down by this Court and the judgment does not lay down the correct law. He prayed that the application for conversion of the revision into appeal be allowed.

Shri D. D. Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the application and submitted that there is distinction between the appeal and the revision. In support of his contention, he referred to the judgments in the cases of Ram Avtar v. Ram Dhani (MANU/SC/0034/1997 : AIR 1997 SC 107) : (1997 All LJ 1908), Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh MANU/SC/0265/1964 and Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal (AIR 1963 SC 698). He further submitted that nature and scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction is different from the appellate jurisdiction and placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of (MANU/SC/0285/1985 : (1986) 1 SCC 512) : (AIR 1986 SC 446). Counsel for the respondents then referred to the judgment in the case of Chittaranjan Crochet (P) Ltd. v. Lakshmoni Dass (Smt) and submitted that if a parry had any doubt then the party could file appeal as well as revision. He submitted that if the order impugned is revisable, it cannot be converted into an appeal as, there is no presentation of appeal in the eyes of law. Revision as filed itself was not maintainable, therefore, revision which was not maintainable and was bad at its initial filing cannot be converted into an appeal. The powers should not be exercised liberally to convert the revision into appeal. In support of his contention, he referred to the judgment in the case of Munshi Singh v. Tula Ram (1980 MPLJ SN 61). He referred to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of T.K. Ramanujam Pillai v. Subramaniam (MANU/TN/0299/1967 : AIR 1967 Mad 298) wherein it is held that second appeal could not be converted into revision in exercise of discretion. He submitted that if the revision is not maintainable, petitioner can file appeal explaining the delay by filing an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act alongwith memo of appeal. In support of his contention, he referred to the judgment in the case of Rakesh Shyamlal Samaiya v. Ajay Kumar Babulal Jain MANU/MP/0662/2000 : (2000 (3) MPLJ 484). However, he referred to the judgment in the case of Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Brothers (MANU/SC/0520/1998 : (1998) 6 SCC 748) : (AIR 1998 SC 2730) wherein in para 7 of the judgment, it is held that against the order of eviction, appeal under Section 96 of the Code was maintainable and second appeal under Section 100 of the Code was maintainable. It is held that against the judgment, revision was not maintainable and the remedy was by way of second appeal alone. High Court entertained the revision and allowed the case in the absence of objection against maintainability of revision petition. Apex Court held that "to meet the ends of justice if the revision is to be treated as second appeal under Section 100, CPC, then requirement of existence of substantial questions of law must be satisfied." It is held that if the revision is converted into second appeal, then requirement of substantial question of law must be satisfied, otherwise, revision cannot be converted into second appeal.

Counsel for the respondents then submitted that once the revision is held to be not maintainable then petitioners are free to prefer an appeal and explain the delay in filing the appeal by moving an appropriate application under the Limitation Act. He referred to the judgment in the case of Rakesh Shyamlal Samaiya (supra). He submitted that in the light of the provisions of Section 104 and Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order impugned is appealable and revision as filed is not maintainable and it cannot be converted into an appeal.

We have considered the arguments of both the parties. It may be mentioned that this Court was suo motu converting revision into appeal and appeal into revision while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. This view was taken in the cases of Gauri Shankar, Rashid Khatoon and Shivkumar (supra). With regard to discretion of the Court in converting appeal into revision, Bombay High Court in the case of U.D. Patel and Company v. C.M. Milligam and Clarke Ltd., AIR 1956 Bombay 598 has held that appeal can be treated as an application for revision. Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Ram Ran Vijay Prashad v. Kishun Singh MANU/BH/0082/1943, has held that revision under Section 115 of the Code was not maintainable against the order which was appealable. In this case, an appeal preferred in a case in which no appeal lay was treated as an application under revision as the question argued was one of the jurisdiction and the Full Bench held that the memorandum of appeal may be treated as a revision as the question relating to jurisdiction is involved in the case.

Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Banka Behari Deb v. Birendra Nath Datta MANU/WB/0290/1927 has held that where no appeal lies from an order, memorandum of appeal can be treated as an application for revision. Where revision has wrongly been preferred it has been permitted to be converted into appeal in the case of Shivkumar (supra). Bombay High Court in the case of Rupam Pictures v. Dr. Brijmohan AIR 1977 Bombay 425 has held that when revision was wrongly preferred, revision was permitted to be converted into an appeal against the order. It is held that in case where appeal lies but revision application is wrongly preferred, the Court has wide discretion to treat it as an appeal if conditions laid down by the law are fully satisfied.

In the case of Bahori v. Vidya Ram MANU/UP/0076/1978, it is held that if revision is filed within limitation prescribed for appeal, then prayer for converting revision into appeal after expiry of period of limitation is maintainable. It is held that there is no specific provision for conversion of an appeal into a revision or vice versa. Consequently, the exercise of power has to be only under the provisions of Section 151 of the Code. The inherent powers of the Court permit the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. The power is undoubtedly discretionary and is to be exercised in a proper case. If the interest of justice requires the passing of such an order or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, the Court would be fully justified in passing an order under this provision. It is further held that there is nothing like a period of limitation for making an application for conversion of an appeals into revision or vice versa. All that is required to be seen is if the appeal or the revision had been filed within the time prescribed for the filing of the appeal, or the revision, as the case may be. Even otherwise, there would be very few cases, were the conversion would be sought before the expiry of the period of filing the appeal. In most cases, the point would emanate after an objection had been filed or made by the other side. It would undoubtedly be open to the Court considering the question of conversion to satisfy itself that the prayer was bone fide and that there was no unusual delay.

In the case of Narmadabai Narayanshet v. Hidayatalli Saheballi (AIR 1949 Bombay 115), Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) has held that considering the question of conversion of appeal into revision, second appeal before the High Court was not maintainable and it was allowed to be converted into revision after preliminary objection was raised that the suit was cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes no second appeal would have been competent against the said decree since the amount or subject matter of the original suit did not exceed Rs. 500/-. Expression "Suit" used in Section 102 of the Code includes execution proceedings with the result that if the suit is of the nature described in Section 102, no second appeal would lie from an order made in execution of the decree passed in such a suit unless the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 500/-. The test in such cases is not the nature of the proceedings in execution, but the nature of the suit in which the decree sought to be executed was passed. That being so, the preliminary objection is, I think, well founded and must be accepted. Prayer was made by counsel for the petitioner that in view of the importance of the question of law which is being raised in the appeal, he should be permitted to convert his second appeal into a revisional application. It is clear that question of Jaw which arises for decision in these proceedings is of considerable importance, and I think it would not be improper to deal with the said point after allowing the appellant to concert his second appeal into a revisional application.

In the case of Bar Council of India New Delhi v. Manikan Tiwari (AIR 1983 All 357) against an order allowing the petition for review on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of record, appeal was preferred it was held not maintainable but it is held that the appeal could be treated as revision. It was held that rejecting the appeal on the ground of maintainability would mean to call upon the appellant to challenge the impugned order by means of a revision and this will not serve any purpose and the Court permitted the appeal to be converted into a revision.

Single Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of N. Karuppan v. M. Sankaran Nair (AIR 1973 Kerala 28) has held that conditional order under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC is not appealable and appeal lies from a final order. It is held that appeal filed when no appeal lay, appeal when technically incompetent, can be treated as a revision and delay can be condoned. Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Narendra Kumar v. Shrimati Suraj Mehta MANU/AP/0174/1982. While considering the amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, it is held that no appeal lay against an order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, since the order is an interim order, High Court can treat the appeal as revision invoking powers under Section 115 of the Code.

In the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise MANU/SC/0187/1998 : (1998) 3 SCC 540 : AIR 1998 SC 1270 appeal was filed by an aggrieved party in the Apex Court under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. A preliminary objection was raised by the Revenue that no such appeal was maintainable. Though the Supreme Court upheld the objection, it did not dismiss the matter and observed (at page 1273 of AIR) :

"We are not disposed to dismiss this appeal on that technical ground at this stage because the appellant could in that situation have sought for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. With all the papers available for deciding the question involved in this appeal, we do not think it proper to drive the appellant to file another special leave petition for that purpose, particularly because of the lapse of almost nine years since the filing of this appeal. We, therefore, treat this appeal as one filed by special leave."
After the 1977 amendment in Section 102 of the Code it is held that if second appeal is filed by the party aggrieved against the decision rendered by the first appellate Court, in appropriate cases, on objection being raised, the High Court may, in its discretion, allow conversion of second appeal into revision. This view has been taken by the Orissa High Court in the case of Loknath Maharana v. Dr. A.B. Mohantil MANU/OR/0057/1977.

However, in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) it is held that in view of the amendment in Section 102 of the Code, second appeal was not maintainable being the suit valued less than Rs. 25000/-. Though the appeal was filed before 1-7-2002, it is held that second appeal was not maintainable. Further it is held that appeal cannot be converted into revision as the scope of both the sections is different. It may be mentioned that the Apex Court while considering the question of conversion of revision into second appeal has considered the question that revision can be converted into second appeal, if substantial question of law arise in the case. However, while converting appeal into revision, question of substantial question of law will not arise. It is true I that scope of appeal and revision is different, but the Courts have been permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. Therefore, rigid view that appeal cannot be converted into revision or vice versa will not be in the interest of justice. A litigant cannot be penalised on account of technical error or mistake committed by the counsel. To meet the ends of justice, revision can be converted into appeal or appeal can be converted into revision while exercising the discretion and if the following norms are fulfilled, then normally order of conversion of revision in to appeal or appeal into revision should be passed :

(i) When revision is converted into second appeal, then before passing the order of conversion, it is to be considered whether substantial question of law arises in the said case, if no substantial question of law arises in the case, revision cannot be converted into second appeal.
(ii) Revision can be converted into appeal if same is filed within time and there is no impediment of limitation. Limitation must be construed from the date of filing of the revision petition or appeal. If the revision or appeal so filed was within limitation, for conversion into appeal or revision, it is to be examined that the appeal or revision, as the case may be, so filed, on the date of institution, was within the limitation and if so, said permission can be granted.

(iii) There is no period of limitation for applying such conversion, but while exercising the powers of conversion, the Court would keep in mind whether appeal or revision, as the case may be, had been instituted within the period prescribed for such proceedings.

We are of the considered opinion that in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) correct law has not been laid down. In this judgment, previous judgments on the point and settled position of law of this Court has not been considered. Ignoring the principle of "stare decisis" settled practise has been unsettled without considering previous judgments. We have considered the earlier views of this Court and the judgments of other High Courts and that of the Apex Court and we hold that in this case, revision can be converted into miscellaneous appeal. Application LA. 3963/03 is allowed and the office is directed to register this revision as miscellaneous appeal and list before appropriate Bench.

Reference is answered accordingly.

Thursday 30 April 2020

Appeal cannot be Disposed Of without Trial Court Record - Supreme Court




Appeal cannot be disposed of without Trial Court record: SC

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The Supreme Court recently set aside a judgment of Delhi High Court which disposed of a criminal appeal without the record of the trial court before it.

The bench considering an appeal against a Delhi High Court order which upheld the conviction and sentence imposed on a man under Sections 498A and 304 IPC by the trial court without the record of the trial court, which was lost during the pendency of the appeal before it.

One of the issue raised in the appeal was whether the order of High Court disposing of the criminal appeal in the absence of original record can be held sustainable in the eyes of law. In this regard, the bench observed:

The High Court has disposed of the appeal filed by the appellant herein without the record of the trial court, which was lost during the pendency of the appeal before it.

The bench then remanded the matter back to the High Court for hearing of the appeals afresh after reconstruction of the record of the trial court.

Source : Livelaw.com

Wednesday 29 April 2020

An ‘Aggrieved’ Third Party Can File Review Petition, Holds SC

An ‘Aggrieved’ Third Party Can File Review Petition, Holds SC [Read Judgement]
Nov 28th 2018, 12:16, by Rashid M A

Ashok Kini

“We have no hesitation in enunciating that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person, may take recourse to the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the person should be aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in some respect.”

The Supreme Court has observed that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person may take recourse to the remedy of review petition.

The bench comprising Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice AM Khanwilkar observed thus while disposing a review petition filed by Union of India against a 2011 judgment in National Textile Corporation Ltd. Versus Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad.

The Supreme Court in 2011 had confirmed the decree of eviction passed against National Textiles Corporation in favour of Trustees of Seth Harichand Rupchand Charitable Trust. Union of India was not party to the said proceedings.

The contention taken by the Union of India was that Validation Act of 2014 has completely altered the status of the parties retrospectively qua the suit property with effect from 1st April, 1994 by a legal fiction, as a result of which the cause of action against NTC as referred to in the subject suit had become nonexistent; and including any decree or order passed against NTC or for that matter, an undertaking filed by NTC in any court or tribunal or authority has been rendered unenforceable by operation of law and cannot be continued or taken forward.

Answering the question of locus of a third party to the proceedings to file a review petition, the bench said: “Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”) which, inter alia, postulates that “any person considering himself aggrieved” would have locus to file a review petition. Order XLVII of CPC restates the position that any person considering himself aggrieved can file a review petition. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court exercises review jurisdiction by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution which predicates that the Supreme Court shall have the power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it. Besides, the Supreme Court has framed Rules to govern review petitions. Notably, neither Order XLVII of CPC nor Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Therefore, we have no hesitation in enunciating that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person, may take recourse to the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the person should be aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in some respect. “

The bench then considered and disposed the review petition with liberty to the Trust to pursue other appropriate legal remedy as per law. It said: “We hold that as per the amended Section 3 of the 1995 Act w.e.f. 1st April, 1994, by operation of law the statutory or protected tenancy rights of Podar Mills Ltd. in respect of the suit property stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government and it continues to so vest in it and that the decree against NTC including the undertaking given by NTC has been rendered unenforceable by a legal fiction. As a result, the Trust being the landlord is obliged to take recourse to remedy against the Central Government (Union of India) to get back possession of the suit property, as per the dispensation specified in the concerned Rent Legislation, if it so desires. It is open to the respondents (Trust) to challenge the validity of the Validation Act 2014, if they so desire.”

Read Judgment 


An Executing Court cannot go behind the Decree.




Whether court can permit correction of decree in execution of decree?

In terms of order 6 Rule 17 CPC, the Court at any stage of the proceedings, may allow either party to alter or amend the pleadings. Reading of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC clearly shows that such an application would lie when the proceedings are pending before the Court. The expression used is 'at any stage of the proceedings' which imply that such an application can be moved only when the proceedings are pending and not when the proceedings had been disposed of. However, an application for amendment can be filed even at the appellate stage as appeal is considered to be an extension of the original proceedings.

13. The 'Court' referred to in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC would imply the Court before which such proceedings are pending and not the Executing Court, which has only to execute the order. It is a settled position that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree.

14. There may be cases where the original court that passed the decree is also the Executing Court. However in such a case the application would have to be filed in the original proceedings and not in the execution proceedings.

15. Section 152 CPC reads as under:

"152. Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders:

Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties."

16. Section 152 CPC permits a Court to correct clerical, arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders arising therein from the accidental slip or omission. However, such an application has to be moved before the same Court which had passed the judgment, decree or order and not before the Executing Court.

17. Reference may also be had to Section 153 CPC which empowers the Court to amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a Suit. Such an amendment can also be carried out only by the Court which passed the relevant decree or judgment.

18. Clearly, in view of the above, impugned order of the Executing Court, treating the application under Section 152 CPC filed by the respondent as an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and thereafter, amending the memo of parties of the decree is not sustainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CM (M) 1173/2018 and CM Appl. 40155/2018

Decided On: 13.03.2020

 Monica Kwatra Vs. Amarjeet Singh Gulati

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.




1. Petitioner impugns order dated 13.09.2018, whereby the Executing Court has treated an application filed by the respondent under Section 152 Civil Procedure Code (CPC for short) as an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and permitted amendment of the memo of parties of the original Suit and also issued fresh warrants of attachment as per the amended memo of parties.

2. Subject Suit was filed by the respondent for recovery against the defendant, named as Smt. Mona Kwatra wife of late Sh. Ramesh Kwatra proprietor of M/s. Ramesh Trading Co. at 11, Narain Market Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006.

3. Since, as per the Trial Court, none appeared after the service of summons, defendant was proceeded ex parte and ex parte decree was passed on 07.04.2017.

4. Subject Execution Petition was filed by the respondent/decree holder against the defendant in the Suit i.e. Smt. Mona Kwatra. Warrants of attachments were issued for attachment of the assets of Smt. Mona Kwatra wife of late Sh. Ramesh Kwatra.

5. Objections were filed by the petitioner contending that petitioner is named Monica Kwatra, wife of late Sh. Rakesh Kwatra and warrants in the name of Mona Kwatra wife Sh. Ramesh Kwatra were sought to be executed against her. It was further contended that she was never served with the summons in the Suit as the summons were addressed in the wrong name and at the address of the shop of the husband of the petitioner, which shop was lying closed after the demise of the husband.

6. It is contended that the record of the Suit also showed that summons was not delivered to the petitioner but were received by one Sh. Naresh Bhalla. It is submitted that the Trial Court believing the said service proceeded ex parte against the defendant in the Suit. It is submitted that the summons received by one Mr. Naresh Bhalla do not disclose as to who this person is. Neither the identity nor the address or contact details of Sh. Naresh Bhalla are available on the summons.

7. Faced with the objections raised by the petitioner that the name of defendant/judgment debtor was Smt. Mona Kwatra, wife of late Sh. Ramesh Kwatra and not that of the petitioner i.e. Smt. Monica Kwatra, wife of Rakesh Kwatra, an application under Sections 151 and 152 CPC was filed by the respondent seeking amendment/correction of the decree.

8. By the impugned order, the Executing Court has held that the correcting could not have been done under Section 152 CPC and accordingly treated the said application as an application under Order 6 Rule17 CPC and amended the memo of parties of the original decree.

9. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has also filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC in the Suit. However, no final orders on the same have yet been passed by the Trial Court.

10. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Executing Court had no power to amend the pleadings or the memo of parties of the Suit and said power, if at all, would lie with the Court which passed the decree. She further submits that an application, under Order 6 Rule17 CPC, would not lie after the Suit has been disposed of.

11. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC reads as under:

"Amendment of Pleadings-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:

Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial."

12. In terms of order 6 Rule 17 CPC, the Court at any stage of the proceedings, may allow either party to alter or amend the pleadings. Reading of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC clearly shows that such an application would lie when the proceedings are pending before the Court. The expression used is 'at any stage of the proceedings' which imply that such an application can be moved only when the proceedings are pending and not when the proceedings had been disposed of. However, an application for amendment can be filed even at the appellate stage as appeal is considered to be an extension of the original proceedings.

13. The 'Court' referred to in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC would imply the Court before which such proceedings are pending and not the Executing Court, which has only to execute the order. It is a settled position that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree.

14. There may be cases where the original court that passed the decree is also the Executing Court. However in such a case the application would have to be filed in the original proceedings and not in the execution proceedings.

15. Section 152 CPC reads as under:

"152. Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders:

Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties."

16. Section 152 CPC permits a Court to correct clerical, arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders arising therein from the accidental slip or omission. However, such an application has to be moved before the same Court which had passed the judgment, decree or order and not before the Executing Court.

17. Reference may also be had to Section 153 CPC which empowers the Court to amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a Suit. Such an amendment can also be carried out only by the Court which passed the relevant decree or judgment.

18. Clearly, in view of the above, impugned order of the Executing Court, treating the application under Section 152 CPC filed by the respondent as an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and thereafter, amending the memo of parties of the decree is not sustainable.

19. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 13.09.2018 is set aside. The Petition is allowed in the above terms.

20. Further, the Trial Court is directed to decide the application of the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC prior to taking up the execution proceedings.

21. The original record, if available with the registry shall be transmitted back to the Trial Court forthwith.

22. Order dasti under signatures of the Court Master.

Tuesday 28 April 2020

If Appeal is filed against Mode of Partition, it amounts to Automatic Stay

If appeal is filed against mode of partition, it amounts to automatic stay of proceedings, execution of instrument of partition is only a stage towards execution of order of partition - Possession even if delivered to parties before partition is made effective will not extinguish status as a co-sharer

Posted: 28 May 2016 08:15 PM PDT




PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

Before :- Hemant Gupta, J.
RSA No. 3615 of 1987. D/d. 24.1.2005

Lal Chand (Dead) through LRs. - Appellants
Versus
Ganga Ram (Dead) through LRs. - Respondents

For the Appellant :- Mr. A.S. Tewatia, Advocate.
For the Respondent :- Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Mukul Aggarwal, Advocate.

Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh

JUDGMENT


Hemant Gupta, J. - The plaintiff pre-emptor is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court whereby his suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the land measuring 16 kanals 11 marlas being a co-sharer and thus have a preferential right to pre-empt the sale was dismissed in appeal by the first Appellate Court.
Read full Judgment »

Compiled by Puneet Batish, Advocate for Online Law Reporter 'http://law.geekupd8.com for providing latest updates on Criminal, Civil, Revenue, Immigration laws, how-to's, bare acts and much more.
High-Court

If appeal is filed against mode of partition, it amounts to automatic stay of proceedings, execution of instrument of partition is only a stage towards execution of order of partition - Possession even if delivered to parties before partition is made effective will not extinguish status as a co-sharer

 Before a secured asset is classified as NPA and some difficulty or any objection is pointed out by the borrower it must be expeditiously resolved with reasons to be communicated to the borrower
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PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

Before :- Hemant Gupta, J.
RSA No. 3615 of 1987. D/d. 24.1.2005

Lal Chand (Dead) through LRs. - Appellants
Versus
Ganga Ram (Dead) through LRs. - Respondents

For the Appellant :- Mr. A.S. Tewatia, Advocate.
For the Respondent :- Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Mukul Aggarwal, Advocate.


JUDGMENT


Hemant Gupta, J. - The plaintiff pre-emptor is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court whereby his suit for possession by way of pre-emption of the land measuring 16 kanals 11 marlas being a co-sharer and thus have a preferential right to pre-empt the sale was dismissed in appeal by the first Appellate Court.
2. The only question which has been raised before the Courts below is whether the plaintiff was a co-sharer on the date of decree passed by the learned Trial Court. According to the defendant-vendee, the land was partitioned and thus the plaintiff ceased to be co-sharer on the date of the decree of the trial Court, whereas as per the plaintiff the land was not partitioned as no instrument of partition has been drawn so far.
3. The learned trial Court found that the instrument of partition has not been drawn which is not a formality. Reliance was placed upon a single Bench judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court reported as Shri Khem Dutt v. Palika, 1984 R.R.R. 535 : 1982 PLJ 391, to hold that the instrument of partition has not been prepared so far and consequently the partition proceedings have not been finalised and thus the plaintiff continues to be a co-sharer and that he has a superior right of pre-emption. However, the learned first Appellate Court accepted the appeal filed by the defendant-vendee on the ground that the instrument of partition has been prepared and delivered to the parties on 16.2.1987. The possession was delivered as per the copy of report Roznamcha Vakiyati dated 3.4.1987 and thus the right of pre-emption of a co-sharer stands forfeited.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that there is nothing on record that the instrument of partition was prepared in February, 1987. It is also argued that even if it is prepared in February, 1987 it will not defeat the right of the plaintiff as he continues to be co-sharer on all the three material dates i.e. on the date of sale, on the date of filing of suit and on the date of decree passed by the trial Court. Therefore, any loss of character as a co-sharer after passing of the decree by the learned Trial Court will not defeat the right of pre-emption.
5. In view of above arguments of the appellant the following substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal :
    Whether the suit of the plaintiff pre-emptor can be dismissed in an appeal on the basis or instrument of partition prepared after the decree passed by the trial Court ?
6. The respondent vendee sought partition of the suit land which was allowed by the Assistant Collector II Grade, Ballabgarh on 21.10.1986 wherein it was ordered that the revenue record in pursuance of the above partition be effected after Kharif, 1986 and that the instrument of partition be prepared after limitation for filing of appeal expires. Ex. P.7 is the memorandum of appeal against the said order passed by the Assistant Collector II Grade and Ex. P.8 is the order dated 24.11.1986 wherein the order passed by the Assistant Collector was stayed. The decree was passed by the learned trial Court on 17.1.1987. There is nothing on record to show that the appeal was decided before the decree was passed by the trial Court or that the instrument of partition was prepared before the said date with the effective date of partition prior to the decree passed by the trial Court.
7. The procedure for partition is contained in Chapter 9 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. Section 121 of the said Act contemplates preparation of an instrument of partition after the partition is completed. The date on which the partition is to take effect is also to be recorded therein. Once instrument of partition is prepared, any owner or tenant to whom any land or portion of a tenancy as the case may be is allotted in proceedings for partition, shall be entitled to possession thereof as against other parties to the proceedings. Sections 121 and 122 of the Land Revenue Act reads as under :
    "121. INSTRUMENT OF PARTITION - When a partition is completed, the Revenue Officer shall cause an instrument of partition to be prepared, and the date on which the partition is to take effect to be recorded therein.
    122. DELIVERY OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY ALLOTTED ON PARTITION. - An owner or tenant to whom any land or portion of a tenancy, as the case may be, is allotted in proceedings for partition shall be entitled to possession thereof as against the other parties to the proceedings and their legal representatives and a Revenue Officer shall, on application made to him for the purpose by any owner or tenant at any time within three years from the date recorded in the instrument of partition the last foregoing section give effect to that instrument so far as it concerns the applicant as if it were a decree for immovable property."
8. It is not only an order of partition which is necessary to be passed but also the instrument of partition is required to be prepared. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show as to on which date, the appeal was decided or the instrument of partition was prepared. Even if the statement in the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court is to be treated as correct, the instrument of partition was prepared after the decree was passed by the learned Trial Court. The question whether the instrument of partition is required to be prepared came up of consideration before a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in a judgment reported as Hadayat Khan v. Shahamand, AIR 1924 Lahore 155, wherein it has been held that even if the sharers took possession of the plots allotted to them before Kharif 1905, their possession up to that date was merely the possession as that of co- sharers.
9. It was held to the following effect while dealing with Section 121 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act :
    "The present, however, is not such a case. There were no doubt proceedings taken with a view to effect partition long before Kharif 1905, but those proceedings culminated and found their ultimate result and expression in the instrument of partition, and that instrument provided that the land should remain joint up to Kharif 1905, and become severally only in that harvest. From this it follows that even if the sharers took possession of the plots allotted to them before Kharif 1905, their possession up to that date was merely the possession of co-sharers in separate possession of portions of the joint estate."
10. Said view has held the field and applied by the Revenue Courts within the State of Punjab. It is so apparent from an order passed by the Financial Commissioner Punjab in Kartar Singh v. Kapur Singh, 1971 P.L.J. 677. The said view has also been taken by Himachal Pradesh High Court in a judgment reported as Shri Khem Dutt v. Palika and another, 1984 R.R.R. 535 : 1982 P.L.J. 391 although dealing with Sections 133 and 134 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act which corresponds to the provisions of Section 121 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. Still further in Lala Ram v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana, 1992(1) RRR 231 (P&H) : AIR 1992 Punjab and Haryana 62, it has been held that the execution of instrument of partition is only a stage towards the execution of order of partition and is not appealable. It is formal order which is necessary to be prepared to recognise the fact of partition. A party to partition proceedings cannot raise the objection in drawing the instrument of partition. If the memorandum of appeal is filed against the mode of partition it amounts to an automatic stay of proceedings pending disposal of appeal.
11. A perusal of Section 122 of the Act shows that the right to take possession arises only on the basis of instrument of partition. Thus the preparation of instrument of partition is not a mere formality but is a necessary document to make a partition legally effective. The date from which the partition is to take effect is required to be indicated in the instrument of partition and possession even if delivered to the parties before the partition is made effective will not extinguish the status as a co-sharer.
12. Thus, the plaintiff was a co-sharer on the date of decree passed by the trial Court and thus has a right to pre-empt the sale. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored while allowing appeal of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is granted two months time to deposit the money in terms of the decree passed by the trial Court.

Appeal allowed.

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