Monday, 4 May 2020

Whether Court can Grant Relief which is not Claimed by Party





Wednesday, 29 June 2016

Whether court can grant relief which is not claimed by party?

In the case of Manohar Lal -vs- Ugrasen & Ors. (supra) the Apex Court held :
235) this Court considered the issue as to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted and that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as under: (AIR p.240, para 22) "22..... It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate it it an alternative case." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar observing that a party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed.
Dealing with the same issue, this Court in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi held: (SCC p.246, para 30) "30. .... Though the court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner."
In Fertilizer Corpn. Of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath this Court held that "the High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for".
In view of the above, law on the issue can be summarised that the court cannot grant a relief which has not been specifically payed by the parties. 
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Glodyne Technoserve Ltd vs State Of M. P. Reported In on 19 March, 2013

            M.A.T. 231 of 2013
                     with
            A.S.T. 38 of 2013

                     

Since both the appeals have arisen out of a common order passed by a learned Single Judge of this court, we propose to dispose of the appeals by a common judgment also. For such purpose, although the matter is appearing under the heading "application", by consent of the learned advocates appearing for the parties, we take up the appeals for final hearing by treating those as on day's list and upon dispensation of all other formalities.
The intra court appeals have been preferred by Rausheena Udyog Ltd. and three others, who were permitted to intervene in the writ proceeding, as also by the State of West Bengal questioning the sustainability of the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this court on February 1, 2013 in W.P. No. 280 (W) of 2013 in the process of e- tender for procurement of micro nutrient fortified/energy dense food in the form of RTE(THR) dated November 21, 2012.
By the order impugned in the intra court appeals, the learned Single Judge has adjudicated upon certain conditions subject to which the tender was invited and the points put forth with respect to non-eligibility of the petitioner no. 1, namely, M/s. Bishamber Dayal Ram Niwas Gupta being a partnership firm of which the petitioner no. 2, namely, Pankaj Gupta, is a partner, at the interim stage without calling for affidavits by the respective parties.
It is pertinent to note that the writ petition was filed by the petitioners questioning the conditions subject to which the tender was invited and that the petitioners did not submit the tender papers till January 9, 2013, which was the last date for submitting e-tenders.
The interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge initially on January 9, 2013 to the effect that the bids of the prospective bidders might be accepted, but the same should not be opened without obtaining leave of the court. It was also observed by the learned Single Judge that non-submission of the bid by the petitioner no. 1 in course of the last date should not be treated as disqualification of it for participation in the tender process and that its participation should be subjected to further orders of the court.
Thereafter, the writ petition was taken up on January 10, 2013 on the point of allowable processing loss on which the learned advocate appearing for the State respondents stated that five (5) per cent processing loss would be allowed. With regard to the prescription of ISI mark, the learned advocate for the State prayed for time to obtain instruction as to whether any of the six (6) bidders complied with the mandatory conditions of clause 3, third bullet point of statutory technical documents subject to which tender was invited.
On January 15, 2013, though the e-tenders were invited, the learned Single Judge, without any prayer having been made in the writ application for participation of the petitioners in the tendering process, ordered that the writ petitioner no. 1 should be entitled to submit hard copy of its bid - both technical as well as financial - by 12-00 noon of January 16, 2013, whereas the last date for submitting tender was already over on January 9, 2013 and no prayer had been made in the writ application for issuance of the interim relief to the aforesaid effect. It was also ordered by the learned Single Judge that the State respondents should be entitled to open the technical bids received by them for ascertaining that who were eligible to participate further in the tender process and have their financial bids opened. The writ petition was ordered to be listed on January 17, 2013.
Thereafter it appears that the writ petition was taken up on January 28, 2013 and the interim order was extended till January 29, 2013. Ultimately, the writ petition was heard on January 29 and 30, 2013, when the court ordered to produce the technical bid of the petitioner no. 1 in its entirety and the interim order was extended further till the next date of hearing.
On January 31, 2013, the intervention, as prayed for by the appellants in M.A.T. 231 of 2013, was allowed. The matter was heard on the question of extension of interim order and was posted for orders on February 1, 2013, on which date the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge adjudicating upon the various terms and conditions of the e-tender as also the eligibility of the petitioner no. 1. It has been held by the learned Single Judge that annual average turn over is to be taken into consideration. The turn over of Macrosoft for the year 2009- 10 has also been ordered to be taken into consideration as the turn over of the petitioner no. 1. It has also been held that the Bureau of Indian Standard has not prescribed any code or standard for food nutrients fit for consumption of adolescent girls. It is only food nutrients for infants that carries ISI mark. The learned Single Judge has also observed that the terms and conditions of the notice inviting tender are not ordinarily open to challenge, but the court can interfere in an exceptional case. It has been held that the petitioner no. 1 cannot be excluded from the zone of consideration for not having ISI code for food nutrients for adolescents. The learned Single Judge held that the aforesaid stipulation apparently had no relation with the objects sought to be achieved.
With respect to the certification of annual production capacity, it has been held by the learned Single Judge that on the basis of a certificate issued by the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board, the production capacity of the petitioner no. 1 is 72,000 MT. Therefore, there would be no reason to exclude the petitioner no. 1 from the zone of consideration on this ground.
Lastly, it has been held by the learned Single Judge that the licence, which has been issued in favour of Vijay Goel, who is a partner of the petitioner no. 1, is valid till March 31, 2013 and it has been carrying on business from the premises of the partnership firm.
Various objections raised with respect to the non- eligibility of the petitioner no. 1 have been dealt with by the learned Single Judge without calling for affidavits in opposition by the respondents and participation of the petitioner no. 1 in the tender process has been allowed. The learned Single Judge ordered for opening of the financial bids of the petitioner no. 1 as well as of other eligible bidders. In the event, the financial bid of the petitioner no. 1 was found to be lowest, the State should not issue supply order without obtaining leave of the court. If the bid offered by the petitioner no. 1 found to be abnormally low and the State was inclined to issue supply order to some other bidder, then in that case, the learned Single Judge gave liberty to the State to mention the writ petition for appropriate order. But if the bid offered by the petitioner no. 1 found to be not lowest and some other bidder found to be suitable for issuance of supply order, the State would be at free to proceed in accordance with law.
Thus, by passing the interim order, certain conditions of the e-tender have virtually been diluted and the petitioner no. 1 has been held to be eligible to participate in the tender process for which the financial bid of the petitioner no. 1 has been ordered to be taken into consideration, whereas no such prayer is made in the writ application.
The writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioners with the following prayers :-
           b)        A   writ   of   and/or        in    the     nature     of
                     Mandamus         do      issue       directing       the
respondent authorities to forthwith rescind and/or cancel and/or withdraw the purported Clause 3. Technical Doc under
(a) "Statutory cover containing the following documents" (3rd bullet at page 5 of the Notice Inviting Tender dated 21st November, 2012) and other arbitrary clauses as enumerated in paragraphs 15 to 19 of the writ petition.
c) A writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus do issue directing the respondents not to give any effect to and/or further effect and to act and/or further act on the basis of the purported clause 3. Technical Doc under (a) "Statutory cover containing the following documents" (3rd bullet at page 5 of the Notice Inviting Tender dated 21st November, 2012) and other arbitrary clauses as enumerated in paragraphs 15 to 19 of the writ petition.
           d)        A   writ   of   and/or        in    the     nature     of
                     Mandamus        do    issue        commanding        the
                     respondents      to     forthwith         remove     the




            arbitrary and anomalous clauses of the
            Notice     Inviting    Tender     as      quoted    in
            paragraphs 15 to 19 of the writ petition
            and   issue      necessary      corrigendum        and
            thereafter proceed to continue with the
            tender process.
e)          A   writ    of   and/or      in   the     nature     of
            Mandamus          do     issue     directing       the
respondents to prescribe the recipe for the product and issue clarifications in respect of various issues raised by the petitioner.
f) A writ of and/or in the nature of Certiorari do issue commanding the respondents to transmit the records of the case forming the basis of the insertion of the impugned clause (a) 3.Technical Doc of the Notice Inviting Tenders as enumerated in paragraphs 15 to 19 of the writ petition as and where appearing in the tender document and to certify the same and on being so certified quash the same so that conscionable justice may be rendered.
h) An order do issue directing the respondents not to give any effect to and/or further effect and to act and/or further act on the basis of the purported Clause 3.Technical Doc, under (a) "Statutory cover containing the following documents" (3rd bullet at page 5 of the Notice Inviting Tender dated 21st November, 2012) and other arbitrary clauses as enumerated in paragraphs 15 to 19 of the writ petition till the disposal of this application. .
In substance, the writ petition was filed praying for quashing the conditions in the notice inviting tender and to stop the entire tender process. The petitioners have not prayed that they should be permitted to participate in the tender process, nor they submitted the tender within the time stipulated in the e-
tender.
The writ petition was filed with the averments that in the year 2000 the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India launched a scheme called 'Kishori Shakti Yojna' with the object to improve the nutritional and health status of girls in the age group of 11-18 years as well as to equip them to improve and upgrade their home-based and vocational skills etc. In the year 2002-03, National Programme for Adolescent Girls was initiated as a pilot project in 51 identified districts across the country to address the problem of under nutrition among adolescent girls. On 9.7.2003 by an office order the CVC issued the guidelines.
On 21.11.2012, the Director of Social Welfare, Department of Women Development and Social Welfare, Kolkata, issued a notice inviting e-tender for procurement of micronutrient fortified/energy dense food in the form of RTE (THR) for supply of the same to the Ananwadi centres as supplementary nutrition to adolescent girls under SABLA of Integrated Child Development Department Services Scheme. On 26.11.2012, the petitioner/respondent no.1 submitted a letter mentioning various issues and seeking clarification in respect of arbitrary ambiguous and contradictory conditions prescribed in the aforesaid tender.
On 29.11.2012, a pre-bid meeting was held wherein the petitioner/respondent no.1 pointed out that the clause relating to BIS standard does not provide the specification of the Bureau of Indian Standard Institute and requested the respondents to clarify the same. Pursuant to such query in the pre-bid meeting, on 7.12.2012 the respondents issued a Corrigendum inter alia providing that 'In page no.5 : Under Clause 3. Technical Doc' (Code No. IS 11536:2007) will be included after 'ISI marked (3rd bullet point)'. On 8.12.2012 a reminder was sent to the respondents requesting to expedite the clarification in respect of various issues raised vide letter dated 26th November, 2012.
On 17.12.2012 by another corrigendum the respondents reverted back to the original condition and the ISI Code number was removed. Last date for submission of tender ws also extended till 9th January, 2013. On 19.12.2012, the bid submission online was initiated at 13 hours and the last date of submission of e-tender online was upto 16 hours on 9th January, 2013. The writ petitioner/respondent no.1 against made representation on 19.12.2012 to the respondents no. 2 and 3 pointing out various inconsistent terms and conditions and requested them to issue necessary clarification in this regard, but no further clarification was issued.
On 27.12.2012 the petitioner/respondent no.1 again submitted representation to the Chief Secretary, State of West Bengal, pointing out inconsistency in the tender conditions and requested him to intervene in the matter. However, nothing was done.
The petitioner/respondent no.1 has raised the question as to whether the conditions laid down in Clause (a) 3. Technical Doc para third and non-prescribing composition of recipe by the respondents in the NIT is reasonable and if not, whether the same requires deletion. It was also submitted that the aforesaid conditions have been incorporated for the benefit of particular suppliers and there was no need to restrict the number of bidders for participating in the bid process and the same was prompted by favouritism and malice.. It was also submitted the restriction that a bidder should have valid certificate issued by the Bureau of India Standard Institute (ISI) IS 11536 : 2007 for manufacturing of ISI marked cereal based food product is not only prohibitive in nature but irrelevant as it related to 'infant milk food' creating unreasonable restriction and as such, is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
The petitioners/respondents have raised various grounds questioning the various conditions of the Notice Inviting Tender, e. g., recipe has not been given in the tender documents and has been left open to the prospective bidder to decide at its will. Other safeguards have also not been observed. The guidelines of Central Vigilance Commission, Government of India (CVC) have been violated. Evaluation criteria of the products have not been evolved. Conditions of the tender are bad in law. Other clauses with respect to penalty due to delay etc. were also questioned. Several conditions have been termed to be ambiguous and arbitrary. It is also submitted that the tenderers having manufacturing units in West Bengal and registered with World Food Programme Organisation have been favoured. No clarification regarding Department's intention to favour these manufacturing units has been provided as yet. Such conditions, which have been mentioned in the tender are illegal, vague and arbitrary. In substance, the petitioners/respondents have questioned the entire process of tender, various conditions and did not pray for participation in the process nor submitted the tender even under protest reserving the rights within the time specified in the Notice Inviting Tender.
Without calling for affidavit-in-opposition the Single Bench has directed technical bid to be placed before the Court. The State Government pointed out various deficiencies due to which the petitioners/respondents was to be adjudged ineligible in the technical bid.
The State Government had pointed out that the scrutiny of the technical bid of the petitioner, Biswamber Dayal Ramnibash Gupta, reveals that partnership firm was registered on 5th September, 2012 and therefore, (i) the mandatory condition of clause of fulfilling three years' manufacturing experience in the same area has been found to be absent, (ii) it is also observed no ISI marked was found with the bid, (iii) annual turnover of the petitioners falls below the minimum turnover required for e-tender and (iv) similar litigation was pending in other courts.
Minutes of the meeting dated 16.1.2013 have also been placed on record where it has been recorded that in compliance of the order passed by this Court off line tender was submitted though tender was invited online. It has been observed that e- procurement system of NIC for the Government of West Bengal, offline bids were not allowed. If offline bids are accepted, there is no provision in the system to include offline bidders in the automated comparison statement generated to determine the lowest bidder after the opening of the financial bid online. It has also been observed that after single offline bid was opened while trying to open online bids, it was found that it could not be opened as security certificate of one digital signature holder is not working and it was resolved to move this Court pointing out the aforesaid aspects. It was also mentioned that the State will loss the central share of assistance to implement the Rajiv Gandhi empowerment of Adolescent Girls Scheme (SABALA) if further delay is caused in tender process thereby delaying procurement as the end of the financial year is knocking at the door. As a consequence, interest of more than six lakhs beneficiaries will be seriously jeopardised and as such, the State Government will be deprived of its legitimate dues. It was further mentioned in the notes that the State Government discharged its service to the adolescent girls who are more than twelve lakhs in number in six districts to prepare themselves for a healthy adult life which will no doubt help to reduce the rate of infant and child deaths. The department has launched a programme on a trial basis for 35 days in six districts having manufactured the above food maintaining nutritional parameter prescribed by the Government of India from the ISI certified manufacturing unit who used to manufacture cereal based food. About 2409 MT. Cereal based Micronutrient Fortified Energy Dense Food has already been manufactured through a ISI manufacturing unit and has already been distributed through 137200 packets on a trial basis in six districts. Lakhs of adolescent girls have consumed without any complaints from any part of the districts since the food was palatable to them. It has been mentioned that the basic principle of this Department for manufacturing of the above rice/wheat based Micronutrient Fortified Energy Dense Food for adolescent girls from ISI certified food manufacturing unit is to strictly maintain as far as possible zero infection in food. The food should be manufactured using ingredients of best quality which shall be free from foreign materials, i.e. dirt, ferrous and non-ferrous extraneous matter and also from bad odour, excessive moisture, insect damage, fungal contamination, to strictly avoid human hands in processing like, handling, cleaning, grinding, extrusion, mixing, packaging etc., all of which are done automatically without touching by any human agency where the risk of infection is zero as far as possible.
It is further mentioned that if the above process is followed to manufacture rice and wheat based fortified Micronutrient Energy Dense Food for adolescent girls, it will ensure quality of the food which adolescent girl can consume safely. Therefore, on the basis of the above principle Women Development and Social Welfare Department had invited e- tender on pilot basis for one year for procuring Micronutrient Fortified Energy Dense Food only from ISI marked cereal based food manufacturing units where quality of food will be ensured without any doubt and adolescent girls will be able to consume safely.
This is basic principle reason why the department has made it mandatory for ISI marked manufacturing unit in the above e-tender for procurement of the above food. It was further submitted that six bidders participated in the tender process online following the e-tender floated by the Government. The details of fulfilling the parameters by various contending parties are noted in a comparative statement annexed with the note on supply e-tender. The detailed bid of the petitioners/respondents is also shown in the statement annexed with the note.
Aggrieved by the impugned order, intra court appeals have been preferred.
Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in M.A.T. 231 of 2013, submitted that the Single Bench has ignored and overlooked the parameters of interference in the tender matters. The conditions subject to which the tenders have been invited are not ordinarily open to judicial review. The decision making process is open to judicial review and not the terms and conditions subject to which the tenders have been invited. It is also submitted that the petitioners did not submit the tender. It was open to the petitioners to submit the tender in case the petitioner wanted to participate in the process. But such step was not resorted to by the petitioners. He was only interested in questioning the terms and conditions and quashment of the entire process. He did not submit the tender in e-form but submitted the tender in physical form on 16th January, 2013 after the last date was over and after the interim order was passed by this Court on 15th January, 2013. It was not open to the Single Bench to permit filing of the tender after last date is over as that would be discriminatory vis-à-vis the other persons who might be situated in the same condition and have not submitted their tenders due to certain conditions mentioned in the Notice Inviting Tender. The Single Bench has also ignoredand overlooked that ISI certification was necessary with respect to the manufacturing process not with respect to the product. The distinction was completely lost sight of and the facts mentioned in the notes submitted with respect of SABLA have not been taken into consideration. Affidavit-in-opposition has not been called for and by way of interim relief, a relief has been granted to the petitioners which was not even prayed for in the writ petition. Further it was pointed out that turn over with respect of Macrosoft was also illegally taken into consideration. The turnover of Macrosoft should not be taken into consideration as Macrosoft is not dealing with the product in question on which tender was invited. With respect to the production capacity also, the decision of the Single Bench is not appropriate. The Court has also ignored the public interest involved and the certification of ISI which was necessitated to ensure that food of better quality be supplied to the adolescent girls of ensuring that they are properly fed and not subjected to various incapacities. Private interest has been given precedence and has been permitted to prevail over public interest. Such kind of final relief could not have been granted that too without finally hearing the matter. The Court cannot modify the terms and conditions of the tender invited and permit a particular person to submit tender on such changed conditions, - particularly when, participation in the process had not been prayed by the petitioner and as such, terms and conditions of the tender cannot be changed for this purpose. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'bel Supreme Court in the case reported in the case of Glodyne Technoserve Ltd. -vs- State of M. P. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 103. He has also relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Monohar Lal -vs- Ugrasen and Others reported in (2010) 11 S.C.C. 557.
Mr. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State/Appellant in A. S. T. 38 of 2013, besides supporting the submissions raised by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that on fact also the Single Bench has not rendered a correct decision. On the question of eligibility, decision rendered is not correct with respect to production capacity, turn over and valid certificate for running the factory as well as on other aspects. Factual findings recorded are incorrect. Final relief could not have been granted by way of interim measure. Adolescent girls are going suffer a lot. Interim order which has been passed by the Single Bench granting participation of the petitioner no.1 could not have been allowed in the facts and circumstances of the case. No terms and conditions subject to which the tenders were invited could have been subjected to the adjudication at the interlocutory stage. Nothing would be left to be decided in case the impugned order is complied with. Direction had been issued to grant contract in the manner suggested by the Court. The learned counsel has relied on decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular -vs- Union of India reported in (1994) 6 S.C.C. 651 and in the case of Larsen and Toubro Limited & Anr. -vs- Union of India and Others. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 430. In the case of Larsen and Toubro Limited & Anr. (Supra), the Apex Court has referred the decision of Ramana Dayaram Shetty -vs- International Airport Authority of India reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489. The Apex Court has laid down that where tenders are invited for grant of government contract, the standard of eligibility laid down in the notice for tenders could not be changed arbitrarily as that would be hit by the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also trite law as held by the Apex Court in the case of Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. -vs- Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and Ors. reported in (2000) 5 SCC 287 that rules of the game cannot be changed once players have entered into the arena. The order of the Single Bench was changed the rules when process of tender was already over. Such interference even if permissible at the time of final stage, could not have been made by the interim order.
Mr. Datta, learned counsel appearing with Ms. Sumita Shaw, for the writ petitioners/respondents, has submitted that the petitioners have come to the Court challenging the various conditions, which could not have been imposed. The conditions are discriminatory and large number of persons have been deprived by the conditions so imposed from participating in the e-tender process. Conditions subject to which tenders were invited rendered the entire process irrelevant and it cannot be said that level of playing field has been granted to all the players. ISI certification has been provided in paragraph bullet point number 3 of clause 3 of Section A of the tender process with respect to the project. He has submitted that there is no certification issued vis-à-vis the product by the Bureau of Indian Standard for which NIT has been invited and no clarification was provided in that regard. Thus, the condition was impossible to be complied with and, hence, impermissible. He has further submitted that for manufacturing process also no such certification is provided by the Bureau of Indian Standard. Thus, insisting for even certification of manufacturing process for the kind of product for which tenders have been invited is illegal and arbitrary. It has deprived a large number of persons from submitting tenders. The learned counsel further submitted that the decision rendered by the Single Bench with respect to the turn over of Macrosoft was taken in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New Horizons Ltd. & Anr. -vs- Union of India & Ors. reported in (1995) 1 SCC 478. The learned counsel further submitted that with respect to capacity of production certificate issued by Rajasthan Pollution Control Board is sufficient. Thus the point of disqualification with respect to the technical bid as submitted by the Respondent State has rightly been overruled by the Single Bench. It was further submitted that factory licence is also in the name of one of the partners and the partner is doing business in the factory and as such, petitioner complied with the conditions of the tender. Hence, it could not be said that the petitioner was not eligible in the technical bid. The decision of the Single Bench overruling objections to the technical bid raised by the State is appropriate and no case for interference is made out. It is also submitted that the State Government has given contract as interim measure to the Co-operative Society to supply the food to adolescent girls. Thus the public interest is not going to suffer as money is not going to waste. The learned counsel has further submitted that either the entire tender process be stayed or no interference be made in the impugned order. He has also taken us through various conditions which according to the petitioners/respondents are not correct and are illegal and arbitrary. Thus the learned counsel has submitted that it is a case where the relief as prayed for should have been ordered by the Single Bench. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order passed by the Single Bench is appropriate and no case for interference is made out.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that in the instant case kind of order which has been passed by the Single Bench ought not to have passed by way of interim measure. At the outset, we clarify that we are dealing with the matter so far as it relates to decide the reliefs granted at the interim stage. We make it clear that we are not deciding the case on merits; any observation made by us shall not influence the ultimate decision to be rendered by the Single Bench in the case on merits at the final stage upon exchange of affidavits.
It is trite law that the terms and conditions subject to which the tenders have been invited are not open to judicial scrutiny. The parameters of interference in such matters have been laid down vividly by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular (supra). The Apex Court has laid down that judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in respect of which judicial review is sought, but the decision-making process itself. Thus it is different from the appeal. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. Since the power of judicial review is not an appeal from the decision, the Court cannot substitute its own decision. Apart from the fact that the court is hardly equipped to do so, it would not be desirable either. Where the selection or rejection is arbitrary, certainly the Court would interfere. It is not the function of a judge to act as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. The Apex Court in Tata Cellular's case (supra) has further laid down that duty of the Court is thus to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be - (1) whether a decision-making authority exceeded its power, (2) committed an error of law, (3) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, (4) reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached, or (5) abused its powers. Therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. Shortly, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under :
(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision- making power and must given effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at. The decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
Principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness has to be applied to the facts of the case. It is further laid down that two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned. It is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant conclusion of the decision-maker. It is only in the case of overwhelming and weight of facts the court can interfere and not otherwise. The decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. The Apex Court has further laid down that modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The court does not have expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. The terms of invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. The tender or award be contract is reached by process of negotiation through several tiers. Apart from the fact that the Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. The decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness, but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. Quashing decision may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increase an unbudgeted expenditure. The Apex Court has summed up the conclusion thus :
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased an unbudgeted expenditure.
Considering the aforesaid principle when we enter into the gamut of the facts of the instant case, we find that Single Bench has interfered with the essential condition subject to invitation of tender from ISI manufacturing process to have ISI certification. Earlier the condition which was mentioned was modified and particularly ISI certification was mentioned with respect to the product. Mistake was realised on the representation being made by the petitioner/respondent no.1 and then corrigendum was issued to meet the condition with reference to the process of ISI certification, the tenderers must have ISI certification with respect to process of manufacture. It is apparent from the corrigendum issued that what was meaning of condition. Apart from that, it is apparent, condition has been added for a cogent purpose by the State Government in order to ensure that the food manufacturing unit maintains as far as possible zero infection in food. The food should be manufactured with using ingredients of best quality which should be free from foreign materials, i.e. dirt, ferrous and non- ferrous extraneous matter and also from bad odour, excessive moisture etc. as pointed out and mentioned hereinabove in the notes of SABLA e-tender. ISI certification has been insisted in processing like handling, cleaning, grinding, extrusion, mixing, packaging etc, all of which is done automatically without touching by any human agency where the risk of infection is zero as far as possible to meet the quality of food for adolescent girls so that they can consume safely. The condition has been imposed to ensure the quality of food. In our opinion, the Single Bench is erred in law in appreciating the condition. It is with respect to the process of manufacturing and not with respect to the product as apparent from the corrigendum issued by the State Government. Apart from that prima facie it was not open to the Single Bench to interfere with the aforesaid condition which prima facie appears to be wholesome for the aforesaid purpose. It is also apparent that various complaints have been coming from various authorities that proper food is not supplied under such welfare schemes and substandard food is being supplied. Allegations have come before us that after consuming such substandard food which is being supplied, children have suffered from ailments like diarrhoea etc., and such complaints are galore. Thus, the condition which has been imposed in order to ensure quality of the food supplied for adolescent girls through proper manufacturing process of BIS standard cannot be prima facie termed as arbitrary, prohibitive or irrational. Such scheme which has been framed is to ensure that girls who belong to age group of 11 to 18 years are properly looked after. The project has been prepared by the Government of India and the significant stress on quality food cannot be ignored and overlooked. Such condition which has been imposed is wholesome and prima facie cannot be interfered while making judicial review. In case such a condition is required to be set aside, then the Single Bench could have done it only at the time of final hearing and not by way of interim order as has been done in the instant case. In case the condition that ISI certification with respect to manufacturing process goes, there shall be several other incumbents who might have applied, as submitted by Mr. Datta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners/respondents, that prohibitive condition has been imposed and condition has been designed in such a manner so as to oust most of the players in the field, i.e. from participation in the process of tender cannot be accepted in the light of supervening public interest of supplying quality food through ISI certified manufacturing process to adolescent girls. We are unable to accept the submissions raised by Mr. Datta that ISI certification was required with respect to the product. We have no hesitation to reject the aforesaid submission considering the corrigendum in the backdrop of the representation made by the petitioners/respondents on which the State Government had acted. The participation of the petitioners/respondents de hors the aforesaid condition was wholly unwarranted. Apart from the participation of the petitioners/respondents by setting the aforesaid condition subject to which the tender was invited, the petitioners/respondents had not even prayed for participation in the tender process in the writ application itself. Once he has not prayed for relief, such relief should not be granted.
In the case of Manohar Lal -vs- Ugrasen & Ors. (supra) the Apex Court held :
235) this Court considered the issue as to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted and that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as under: (AIR p.240, para 22) "22..... It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate it it an alternative case." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar observing that a party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed.
Dealing with the same issue, this Court in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi held: (SCC p.246, para 30) "30. .... Though the court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner."
In Fertilizer Corpn. Of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath this Court held that "the High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for".
In view of the above, law on the issue can be summarised that the court cannot grant a relief which has not been specifically payed by the parties. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid certain legal propositions."
As the petitioner had in fact not participated in the entire process and did not submit the tender till 9th January 2013 which was the last date of submitting e-tender, did not make any prayer to permit it to participate in the tender process subject to which the tenders have been invited, relief of permitting interim participation after the date of submitting the tender was over that too in the physical form whereas the tender was invited in e-form, could not have been granted by way of interim measure. Affidavit-in-opposition ought to have been called for in such case and such case should have been decided at the earliest as public interest was involved. In case interference was required, public interest could not be ignored and by virtue of the interim order which has been passed, the entire process has stood, in our considered opinion, vitiated. The participation of the incumbent is not in terms of the tender and could have been ordered by way of interim order and his financial bid could not have been directed by the Single Bench to be opened nor it could be direction that in case the financial bid of the petitioners/respondents was lowest, no contract be awarded without leave of Court. Thus, virtually the writ petition has been decided by way of interim order without calling for affidavit-in-opposition. In such a matter, normally interim stay should not be granted except in exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances were not available in the instant case. In our considered opinion, the decision of the Single Judge in respect of the validity of the aforesaid condition, subject to which the tenders were invited itself, cannot be said to be proper. We need not enter into the other aspects with respect to annual turn over, certificate of having requisite production capacity, factory license and experience of three years and various other aspects raised by the learned counsel as adverted to by the Single Bench. Suffice it to observe with respect to the process of manufacture that Macrosoft whose turn over has been taken into consideration is a company dealing in shares, securities and other investments as apparent from the certificate of Chartered Accountants with regard to the assessment year 2012-13. It has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, that the said document had been filed by the petitioner/respondent no.1 with the technical bid.
Thus, prima facie it appears, without meaning to finlly decide such question, when a company is dealing with shares, securities and investment its turnover for the assessment year 2011-12 could not have been taken into consideration with respect to the kind of product for which the tender was invited. No doubt it was submitted by Mr. Datta, learned counsel that it is with respect to the financial capacity that the turn over has to be assessed and hence such turn over may be of other businesses also. However, this question is not so simple and has to be gone into at the time of final decision whether the turn over of different business can be considered particularly when the stand of the State Government is that turn over with respect to the particular product is insisted so as to ensure that the tenderer has sufficient business and its product is having sufficient circulation and same is also one of the parameters relating to quality and acceptance of the product by the public at large. Thus turn over of the kind of goods for which the tender was invited may be a parameter to be taken into consideration though it was not rightly disputed that turn over of consortium can also be taken into consideration while considering the total turn over. It was also submitted that in the terms and conditions subject to which the tender has been invited, at one place it has been mentioned the annual turn over has to be considered and at another place it was mentioned that average of the annual turn over of three years has to be taken into consideration. Thus, even if turn over is less in one year could not have been a ground to reject the tender, average of the turn over of three years has to be taken into consideration.
In our opinion, whether the turn over of Macrosoft could have been included was not a question which could be decided without calling for the affidavit-in-opposition from the parties considering their stands. Thus the decision by way of interim stage on the aforesaid aspect cannot be said to appropriate. The aforesaid aspect is also to be gone into at the time of final decision.
It was also submitted by Mr. Datta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners/respondents that recipe was not provided in the tender. Thus it was a vague condition. In case the condition was vague and tender could not have been submitted there could not have been any interim order in the nature which has been passed by the Single Bench in the facts of the instant case. The tenders have been submitted under the order of the Court. Thus it is also a question to be gone into whether the entire process is to be considered to be vitiated with reference to the aforesaid condition. It could not have been gone into at interim stage and that too by way of interim order as it may affect other players in the field.
With respect to the production capacity, certificate of Rajasthan Pollution Control Board has been relied upon. In such cases where respondents to be held to be suitable to participate in the process of tender, final decision is required to be rendered. This condition subject to which technical bid has been disqualified should not normally be the subject matter of interim order. This aspect has to be considered after the entire facts are pleaded and documents are before the Court. Thus, decision cited by the Single Bench on this aspect cannot be said to be sustainable. Even if the parties have acquiesced, it ought not to have been decided by way of interim order; it should be decided at the time of final hearing.
We place it on record that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, has submitted that capacity mentioned in the Certificate of Rajasthan Pollution Control Board is not acceptable to them. However, such stand has to be taken before the Single Bench by way of appropriate pleading in the affidavit-in-opposition and then only it can be properly adjudicated.
Coming to the question with respect to the registration of partnership firm, the partnership firm of the petitioner no.1 appears to have been registered on 5th September, 2012. However, it was submitted by Mr. Datta that only one new partner was inducted. Earlier there was a partnership firm which was doing the same business and was registered in the year 2002, but original partnership deed of 2002 was not placed on record. Thus, this question could not have been effectively adjudicated in the absence of entire documents. Thus, in our considered opinion, by way of interim relief, the aforesaid aspect ought not to have decided by the Single Bench.
It was also submitted that since the State had permitted 5% processing loss after submission of bids by the tenderers on 9th January, 2013, it was appropriate for the Single Bench to allow participation of the petitioners/respondents subject to giving benefit of the aforesaid condition. In our considered opinion, when tender was not submitted by the petitioners/respondents within the specified date, normally it is not to be ordered by the Court that the petitioners will submit the tender in a different form than the form in which e-tenders have been invited. Here, in the instant case, the tender in the physical form was permitted to be submitted. That was not appropriate in our opinion considering the particular relief as prayed for in the petition. Even if the Government has specified 5% processing loss, the same could not have been a ground to permit participation by the incumbent who has not submitted the tender. It is also to be considered whether such conditions can be clarified after the tender is submitted or it is necessary to specify them in the NIT itself. But in no case, in our opinion, the specification of 5% processing loss could have given an entitlement to the petitioners/respondents to submit the tender beyond the tender date and that too in another form in which tender was not invited.
The Single Bench has virtually set out the terms and conditions of the tender by the interim order itself which is prima facie, in our opinion, is quite impermissible as that may palpably violateArticle 14 of the Constitution of India, with respect to other players who have submitted the tenders as well as those who have not submitted the tenders but were similarly situated with the petitioners/respondents. It has been observed by the Apex Court in Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. -vs- Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and Others reported in (2000) 5 SCC 287 that if a term of the tender was deleted after the players entered into the arena it was like changing the rules of the game after it had begun and, therefore, if the Government or the Municipal Corporation was free to alter the conditions fresh process of tender was the only alternative permissible. Thus, in the instant case rules of game have been changed by the interim order itself which could not have been done and even if rules of game are changed in respect of a party, the deprivation of chance of participation of others cannot be ruled out. Thus, the impugned order cannot be said to be sustainable.
We set aside the order passed by the Single Bench dated 1st February, 2013. As sequel it follows that the financial bid of the petitioner no.1/respondent no.1 cannot be considered. We, however, keep all questions open for decision by the Single Bench at the final stage.
Apart from that, in our opinion, the petitioner no.1/respondent no.1 having failed to submit the tender could not have participated in the process of tender.
Thus, both the appeals are allowed. Consequently, the applications are also disposed of.
It is open to the State Government and other authorities to proceed with the tender process considering the e-tenders which was submitted and to take final decision and to give contract also. That would be, in our considered opinion, considering the interest of the adolescent girls to get appropriate food by the appropriate manufacturer having ISI certification for manufacturing process which ensures quality food and rules out infection etc. and to ensure appropriate process of manufacturer as enumerated in the note submitted by the State Government. The public interest has to prevail in such matter and not private interest. We have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order.
Resultantly the appeals are allowed. The interim orders dated 15th January, 2013 and 1st February, 2013. The action taken by the State shall be subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. We request the Single Bench to decide the writ petition as far as possible within six weeks after obtaining affidavit-in-opposition from the respective parties.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
Mr. Datta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners/respondents, has prayed for stay of the order. Considering the public interest and also the fact that financial year is coming into an end, the contract has to be granted for utilising the money within the time bound framed, we are not inclined to grant stay.
(Joymalya Bagchi, J.) (Arun Mishra, Chief Justice)

Sunday, 3 May 2020

Whether it is Necessary to seek Cancellation of Sale Deed if it was Executed during Pendency of Suit




Saturday, 26 October 2019

Whether it is necessary to seek cancellation of sale deed if it was executed during pendency of suit?

 In our opinion, when the sale deed had been executed during the pendency of suit the purchaser pendente lite is bound by the outcome of the suit. The provisions of Section 52 prevent multiplicity of the proceedings. It was not at all necessary to file a suit for cancellation of the sale deed as the vendor had no authority to sell land of other co-sharers. He had right to alienate his own share only which he had in the property to the extent of 14/104th. As such the right, title and interest of Bala Mallaiah were subject to the pending suit for partition in which a preliminary decree was passed in the year 1970 which had attained finality in which the vendor of Bala Mallaiah, Defendant 1 was found to be having share only to the extent of 14/104th.  { Para 48}

 Therefore, it is settled legal position that the effect of Section 52 is not to render transfer effect during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit and the pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court. Therefore, in the present suit defendant No. 2 is bound by the decree which may be passed against defendant No. 1. Admittedly, by virtue of compromise decree in R.A. No. 272/2004 defendant No. 1 is aware that the suit property was allotted to the share of plaintiffs and he had no right title and interest so as to transfer the same in favour of defendant No. 2 by executing registered sale deed dated 02.05.1997 as per Ex. D1. In spite of knowing consequences of the same, defendant No. 1 executed the sale deed during the pendency of suit bearing O.S. No. 45/1994. Therefore, the said sale deed is hit by Section 52 of Transfer Property Act. Though, it cannot be held as void ab initio, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment referred supra, Pendente lite purchaser defendant No. 2 herein is bound by the decree passed in the suit against his vendor.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (KALABURAGI BENCH)

RSA No. 1346/2007

Decided On: 24.04.2019

 Gurushantappa  Vs. Shankar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.G.M. Patil, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Karnat 113
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Good Legal Article on Lis Pendens ( S 52 of Transfer of Property Act)




Good legal article on Lis pendens( S 52 of Transfer of Property Act)





Lis pendens means that nothing new should be introduced in 

pending litigation.

      Where a suit or proceeding is pending between two persons with respect to immovable property and one of the parties thereto sells,or otherwise transfers subject matter of litigation, then transferee will be bound by result of suit or proceeding,whether or not, he had notice of suit or proceeding .This rule is known as the rule of lis pendens. This rule affects the purchaser not because the pending suit or proceeding amounts to notice but because the law does not allow litigants to give to others pending the litigation any right to property in dispute so as to prejudice the other party.
Thus the rule of lis pendens is based on the necessity for final adjudication: It aims at prevention of multiplicity of suits or proceedings.A transaction entered in to during pendency of a suit can not prejudice the interests of a party to suit who is not party to transaction. The object of the rule is to protect one of the parties to a litigation against act of the other.

     The doctrine of lis pendens can not be availed of by the transferor and it is really intended for the protection of the other party, that is the party in the suit other than the transferor.
Suits decreed exparte also falls within the scope of doctrine of lis pendens ,provided they are not collusive.
       Compromise decree also falls within the scope of doctrine of lis pendens, provided compromise is not result of fraud.
The rule of lis pendens does not apply to a transfer by a person who subsequent to transfer is added as a party to the pending suit. A transfer by a person before he is made a party is not affected by rule of lis pendens.
       It may be noted that the effect of the rule of lis pendens is not to invalidate or avoid the transfer,but to make it subject to the result of the litigation. This provision operates even if the transferee pendente lite had no notice of pending suit or proceeding at the time of transfer.
     Its essentials-In order to constitute a lis pendens, the following six elements must be present:
1.There should be a suit or a proceeding.
2.The suit or proceeding must be one in which a right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question.
3.The suit or proceeding must not be a collusive one .
4.The suit or proceeding must be pending.
5. The property directly and specifically in question in the suit must be transferred during such pendency.
Pending litigation-
The pendency continues from the time the plaint is presented to the proper court till it is finally disposed of, and complete satisfaction or discharge of the decree is either obtained or has become unobtainable.
It may be noted here that pendency of suit must be in competent court in India. The reason behind this rule is that in foreign court, not only the procedure, but even the remedy may be different from that prevailing in India.
Bonafide litigation-
The suit or proceeding must not be collusive.
Right to property must be in dispute-
The right to an immovable property must be directly and specifically in issue in the suit or proceeding.This will happen in a suit for specific performance of contract to transfer immovable property.
Transfer during pendency of litigation only-
For the purpose of this doctrine, the transfer must be made only during pendency of suit or proceeding. Naturally there a transfer before the suit will not be affected by lis pendens.It does not matter that the deed is registered after suit is filed, provided it was executed prior to its institution.
The decree of first court does not always put an end to the litigation.Therefore,even after dismissal of a suit,a purchaser is subject to lis pendens if an appeal is thereafter fled. Thus the rule of lis pendens applies to a transfer made after decree of the court but before filing of an appeal.


 In greater Bombay,however it is necessary to register the notice of lis pendens under S 18 of Indian Registration Act. Otherwise a pendency does not affect any transaction.

Important judgments on Lis pendens

Friday, 1 May 2020

Daughters Have Equal Rights In Ancestral Property, Even If They Were Born Before Enactment Of Hindu Succession Act, Holds Supreme Court

Daughters Have Equal Rights In Ancestral Property, Even If They Were Born Before Enactment Of Hindu Succession Act, Holds Supreme Court [Read Judgment]
Feb 4th 2018, 09:07, by Sukriti

Manu Sebastian

The Supreme Court has held that daughters who were born before the enactment of Hindu Succession Act 1956 are entitled to equal shares as son in ancestral property.  The ruling was rendered in an appeal filed by daughters challenging a decree in a partition suit, which excluded them from partition.

 The partition suit was filed by the grandson of the deceased propositus of a joint family in 2002. The Trial Court held that daughters were not entitled to share in property, as they were born before 1956, the year of enactment of Hindu Succession Act. The Trail Court also denied them the benefit of 2005 amendment, which conferred equal coparcenary status to daughters as sons.  The High Court upheld the decree of the Trial Court.

The Supreme Court held that the Courts below erred in holding that daughters were not entitled to partition because they were born before 1956. It was held that according to Section 6 of the Act ,when a coparcener dies leaving behind any female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act(which includes a daughter), his undivided interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property would not devolve upon the surviving coparcener by survivorship but upon his heirs by intestate succession.  Therefore, the interest of the deceased coparcener would devolve by intestate succession on his heirs, which included his daughters.

The Court also held that the daughters were entitled to the benefit of 2005 amendment as well, and on that basis also they were entitled to shares.  It was settled in Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36 rights under the amendment area available to daughters living on the date of amendment, irrespective of when they were born.  In the instant case, the bench comprising Justice A.K Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan explained it further, and stated that the amendment declared that a daughter ‘shall by birth’  became coparcener in her own right in the same manner as son. Hence, the daughter will get coparcenary right by virtue of the amendment, ‘since birth’. It was observed as follows :-

Section 6, as amended, stipulates that on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth. The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth. The section uses the words in the same manner as the son. It should therefore be apparent that both the sons and the daughters of a coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth. It is the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth. Devolution of coparcenary property is the later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first stage of a coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and as is well recognized.

Also, the fact that the partition suit was filed in 2002 was held to be inconsequential. The Court stated that so far as partition suits are concerned, the partition becomes final only on the passing of a final decree. The decree was passed in 2007. Here, the rights of the daughters got crystallised in 2005, and hence the Trial Court ought to have taken into account that aspect while passing decree in 2007.

The Court also observed that 2005 amendment was brought in on the touchstone of equality, thus seeking to remove the perceived disability and prejudice to which a daughter was subjected.

The fundamental changes brought forward about in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by amending it in 2005, are perhaps a realization of the immortal words of Roscoe Pound as appearing in his celebrated treaties, The Ideal Element in Law, that “the law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and the need of change.- the Bench observed.

Hence, it was held that shares will devolve on the daughters as well.

Read the Judgment Here


Mortgagees Right To Sell: Past Situation




Mortgagees Right To Sell: Past Situation
The power of the mortgagee to sell without intervention of the court, before the incorporation of such right under Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was a subject-matter of controversy and divergent views.

This power of sale, a feature of the English mortgage was originally confined to Englishmen or to Indian residents in the Presidency Towns who were conversant with the forms of English mortgage and English law and procedure as administered in the Presidency Towns. In the mofussil, prior to the Transfer of Property Act, there were certain regulations governing the law of mortgages between the parties who were not Europeans. Those regulations did not empower the mortgagee to effect sale of the mortgaged property without the intervention of the court.

Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was modelled on the English Conveyancing Act, 1881 and the English Law of Property Act, 1925. Section 69 was later remodelled by amending Act 20 of 1929 drawing the principles from the English law.

Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 contains five sub-sections. Sub-sections (1) and (2) as detailed hereunder, deal with the circumstances under which the mortgagee's right to exercise the power of sale without the intervention of the court arises. Sub-sections (3) and (4) respectively dwell on the title of the purchaser from the mortgagee and the manner of deployment of sale proceeds of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee, his duties and responsibilities. Sub-section (5) states that nothing in this section applies to powers conferred before the first day of July, 1882.


The right under Section 69 is as much and as full a right as the right of redemption of the mortgagor. The mortgagee is, in no sense, a trustee for the mortgagor in the matter of the power of sale; as he holds it for protection of his interest and for his benefit. The mortgagee is not debarred from exercising the power of sale, even though the mortgagor files a suit for redemption. So long as the mortgage money is not paid or validly tendered, the mortgagee with full knowledge of a pending suit for redemption and even to defeat the suit can enforce his power of sale under this section.

While clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) require that power of sale without intervention of the court must be expressly conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed, no such conditions need be fulfilled, where the mortgage is an English mortgage and neither of the parties is Hindu, Mohammedan or Buddhist or any sect, race etc., as stipulated under clause (a) of sub-section (1).

Power of sale without intervention of court

The words "power of sale" refer to a clause expressly included in the mortgage deed. They mean conveyancing. The expression has not been defined in the Act. It includes all steps which are necessary to be taken in connection with a sale. The law permits the greatest freedom of contract, unless it is expressly taken away. If any party contends that a particular clause restricts, in any way, the power of parties to enter into a contract, the burden rests on him to show that the words prevent an agreement between the parties.

The power of sale, under Section 69, can be exercised only in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). The situation of the property is immaterial in cases falling within clauses (a) and (b).



A mortgagee has no right of sale if there is no default in payment of the mortgage money. There can be default in payment of mortgage money only after it has become due, and not before. In cases, where no time is fixed for payment of the mortgage money, there must be a demand for payment before it can be said that the mortgagor has made a default in payment of the mortgage money. It has been held in Purasawalkam Hindu Janopakara Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. v. Kuddus Sahib that where the amount due for principal is not repayable at any particular date, nor is anything stated as to when it is to be repaid, there can be no default in the payment of the principal sum due until there is a demand made for the money.

Section 69(1) (a)

The first case in which the mortgagee can have the power to sell is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It lays down the following conditions for the acquisition of the power, namely: (1) that the mortgage must be an English mortgage, as defined in Section 58(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and (2) neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee must be-
(i) a Hindu, Mohammedan or Buddhist, or
(ii) a member of any other race, sect, tribe, or class from time to time specified in this behalf by the State Government in the Official Gazette.

The power of sale is inherent in the mortgagee, if Conditions (i) and (ii) mentioned above are satisfied. Thus it can be exercised where an English mortgage is executed by a company, which can be said to have no religion3 In L.V. Apte v. R.G.N. Price, the A.P. High Court applied Section 69 to an English mortgage between a company and trustees for debenture-holders, some of the trustees being Hindus.



Section 69(1) (a) is confined only to a select sect of mortgagors and mortgagees who do not belong to the majority communities in India. This section is taken advantage of by corporate bodies who are not natural persons since such bodies are not deemed to belong to any religion. As far as individuals are concerned, this section can be adopted if both the mortgagor and mortgagee do not belong to the religion, race, sect, tribe or class which are excluded from the purview of Section 69(1) (a).

If the conditions in Section 69(1) (a) and Section 69(2) are complied with, mortgagee's power of sale arises suo motu.

It is opined that Section 69(1) (a) is outdated in the present circumstances since the stipulations cannot be applied to the commercial transactions like mortgages, in letter and spirit. No community can be compelled to exclude themselves from a particular commercial venture as it would affect their constitutional rights.

Sections 69(1) (b) and 69(1) (c)

The words "expressly conferred" in clauses (b) and (c) indicate that the inherent power available under clause (a) is not available under clauses (b) and (c).

To bring a case under Section 69(1) (b), it is necessary to establish that

(i) a power of sale without the intervention of the court is expressly conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed, and
(ii) the mortgagee is Government. This clause is applicable only where the mortgagee is the Government and does not extend to any other person. It applies both to the State Governments and the Central Government.

Section 69(1) (c) requires that

(i) a power of sale without the intervention of the court must have expressly been conferred on the mortgagee by the mortgage deed, and

(ii) the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, must, on the date of the execution of the mortgage deed, have been situate within the towns of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay or in any other town, or area, which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.



It is observed that the three cases mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act are independent and mutually exclusive. Clause (a) applies only where the mortgage is an English mortgage and the parties do not belong to certain religions, or sects, etc. Clause (b) applies to cases where the mortgagee is the Government. Under clauses (a) and (b), it is not necessary that the property mortgaged should be situated in any particular place. It may be situated in any part of India. But an essential condition of clause (c) is that the mortgaged property must be situated within any of the towns or area, specified in the clause.

Conditions for exercise of power

Section 69(2) (a) and Section 69(2) (b) specify the conditions for exercise of the power. These conditions are imperative and cannot be varied by an agreement between the parties. The power to exercise the right of sale arises when

(i) (a) notice in writing requiring payment of the principal money has been served on the mortgagor, or on one of several mortgagors, and

(b) default has been made in payment of the principal money, or of part thereof, and

(c) such default has continued for three months after such service; or

(ii) some interest under the mortgage amounting at least to five hundred rupees is (a) in arrear, and (b) remains unpaid for three months after becoming due.



Conditions (i) and (ii) are in the alternative. It is sufficient if any one of them is fulfilled.

The power of sale under Section 69(1) can be exercised by the mortgagee only when the conditions under Section 69(2) are fulfilled.

No notice is necessary when default is made for the payment of interest. It is sufficient that interest under the mortgage amounting at least to five hundred rupees is in arrear and unpaid for three months after becoming due.

Notice cannot be waived

The notice required by Section 69(2) (a) is not only necessary but is imperative and even the period of three months cannot be curtailed by agreement of the parties.

The Supreme Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam held that the conferment of power on mortgagee to sell without intervention of the court in a mortgage deed by itself will not deprive the mortgagor of his right of redemption. The equity of redemption is not extinguished by mere contract for sale. Therefore, until sale is complete by registration the mortgagor does not lose his right of redemption. In view of the fact that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another, it cannot be said that the mortgagor lost the right of redemption just because the property was put to auction. The mortgagor has a right to redeem unless the sale of property was complete by registration in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act.

Section 69(1)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 unduly excludes the majority communities in India from exercising the power of sale available for an English mortgagee. This section appears to have been enacted only for the transactions between mortgagors and mortgagees who are English people or people of English origin.

Section 69(1) (a)a blot on statute

When the debate on uniform civil code in India is hotting up amongst the law-makers and the general public, retention of Section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is a blot on the statute-book. This section is a clear discrimination between religious communities in commercial transactions in India.

Section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has lost its relevance in the present-day secular circumstances. English mortgage is rarely resorted to by the lenders like banks in view of the religious discrimination in the section itself and stamp duty and registration expenses being heavy to be borne by the mortgagors.



It is suggested that an amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act is the need of the hour deleting the portion regarding restriction of the power of sale without intervention of the court only to certain religious communities.

The power of sale under Section 69(1) (c) of the Transfer of Property Act can be exercised only when the mortgaged properties are situated within certain towns. The restriction in respect of location of the properties within certain towns for the purpose of Section 69(1) (c) might have been a carefully considered decision at the time when the section was inserted into the Act. It protects the gullible rural masses from the usurious moneylenders. Since then, the situation has undergone changes and the people in the rural sector are prudent enough to know the implications of mortgage transactions.

Mortgagees Right To Sell: Present Situation

At present, an attempt has been made to change the situation by passing the “Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Act 54 of 2002)”, which protects the interests of the banks and other financial institutions by providing ways to recover their amounts by selling the assets of the mortgagor.

The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, fondly called by bankers as Securitisation Act, has recently been enacted conferring powers on banks and financial institutions, if they are secured creditors, to realize the securities by sale etc., without intervention of court. The Act contains a provision overriding the provision of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the said Act reads as under:

"13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or Section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

The provisions of the Act have been made applicable exclusively to banks and financial institutions as secured creditors to enforce their security interest with a view to recovering their debts. That is, if the banks and financial institutions are secured creditors having lent against securities like mortgage of immovable property, charge, hypothecation they can take over and sell such securities after giving 60 days' notice to the borrowers so as to adjust the loan, without resort to litigation in a competent court of law. The provisions of the Act cannot be considered to have been extended to the secured creditors in general. In a nutshell, the provisions of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 can be ignored by the banks and financial institutions in the matter of recovery of their debts ex curia whereas other creditors have to file a suit in a competent court for recovery of the loan. Otherwise, Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 still remains on the statute and is applicable to other creditors who are not banks and financial institutions. The banks and financial institutions are empowered to short-circuit the legal process to enforce the securities for recovery of their loans while the other creditors such as individuals, association of persons have to undergo the rigmorale of court proceedings. This is a clear discrimination endowing one section with legal favouritism and depriving similarly placed others of such right. Hence the suggestion for the amendment to make the law uniform to all creditors who have lent against mortgage securities.

It is suggested that the stipulation of certain notified towns in Section 69(1) (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 should be deleted by an amendment since such a stipulation does not have any sanctity or reasonable purpose in the present circumstances.

Recourse to legal proceedings through a court of law for recovery of debts, though secured by mortgage, is not only time-consuming but expensive too. The suggested amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 will result in enforcement of mortgage security by the mortgagee without resort to court proceedings and will, to some extent, disburden the courts from the current scenario of docket explosion so that the other cases can be adjudicated as expeditiously as possible.

Conclusion
After going through this project, I have come to the conclusion that, section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has lost its relevance in the present-day secular circumstances. English mortgage is rarely resorted to by the lenders like banks in view of the religious discrimination in the section itself and stamp duty and registration expenses being heavy to be borne by the mortgagors.

This is because, section 69(1) (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 unduly excludes the majority communities in India from exercising the power of sale available for an English mortgagee. This section appears to have been enacted only for the transactions between mortgagors and mortgagees who are English people or people of English origin.

Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that an amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act is the need of the hour, deleting the portion regarding restriction of the power of sale without intervention of the court only to certain religious communities.


Further, as regards the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 is concerned, there is a clear discrimination endowing one section with legal favouritism and depriving similarly placed others of such right. Hence I would suggest for the amendment to make the law uniform to all creditors who have lent against mortgage securities. This is because this Act is applicable only to banks and financial institutions and not to other types of creditors.

Further, recourse to legal proceedings through a court of law for recovery of debts, though secured by mortgage, is not only time-consuming but expensive too. The suggested amendment to Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 will result in enforcement of mortgage security by the mortgagee without resort to court proceedings and will, to some extent, disburden the courts from the current scenario of docket explosion so that the other cases can be adjudicated as expeditiously as possible.

Therefore, in my view there is an urgent need to amend the provisions of sec.69 of the "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", so that the interest of the secured creditors can be realized more fruitfully and without much delay and harassment.

The author can be reached at: rks_nlu@legalserviceindia.com / Print This Article

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Whether Appeal can be Converted into Revision and Revision can be Converted into Appeal




Friday, 1 May 2020

Whether appeal can be converted into revision and revision can be converted into appeal?

It may be mentioned that the Apex Court while considering the question of conversion of revision into second appeal has considered the question that revision can be converted into second appeal, if substantial question of law arise in the case. However, while converting appeal into revision, question of substantial question of law will not arise. It is true I that scope of appeal and revision is different, but the Courts have been permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. Therefore, rigid view that appeal cannot be converted into revision or vice versa will not be in the interest of justice. A litigant cannot be penalised on account of technical error or mistake committed by the counsel. To meet the ends of justice, revision can be converted into appeal or appeal can be converted into revision while exercising the discretion and if the following norms are fulfilled, then normally order of conversion of revision in to appeal or appeal into revision should be passed :

(i) When revision is converted into second appeal, then before passing the order of conversion, it is to be considered whether substantial question of law arises in the said case, if no substantial question of law arises in the case, revision cannot be converted into second appeal.
(ii) Revision can be converted into appeal if same is filed within time and there is no impediment of limitation. Limitation must be construed from the date of filing of the revision petition or appeal. If the revision or appeal so filed was within limitation, for conversion into appeal or revision, it is to be examined that the appeal or revision, as the case may be, so filed, on the date of institution, was within the limitation and if so, said permission can be granted.

(iii) There is no period of limitation for applying such conversion, but while exercising the powers of conversion, the Court would keep in mind whether appeal or revision, as the case may be, had been instituted within the period prescribed for such proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Civil Revision No. 1259 of 1999

Decided On: 25.08.2004

Om Prakash  Vs.  Dwarka Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.S. Jha and A.K. Gohil, JJ.



 In this revision, an application I. A. 3963/03 is filed by the petitioners for converting this revision into miscellaneous appeal under Order XLIII, Rule l(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was opposed by the respondents inter alia contending that the scope of appeal is different from the scope of revision, and therefore, application and revision be dismissed. Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Munnilal MANU/MP/0515/2002, whereas counsel for the petitioners has referred to the decision of the single Bench of this Court in the case of Shivkumar v. Ramkatori MANU/MP/0144/1976 : (1977 JLJ 33).Since two conflicting views were brought to the notice of the single Bench, single Bench has referred the dispute for decision in accordance with law by the Division Bench.

Question involved in the case is whether revision can be converted into appeal and vice versa.

Counsel for the petitioners submitted that this question has been settled long back and this Court time and again is permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. While delivering the later judgment in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) single Bench has not considered the previous judgments on this subject and ignored the principle of stare decisis. Long settled view has been upset in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra). He submitted that against the order of remand by the Additional District Judge, counsel was of the opinion that order was in exercise of inherent powers by the first appellate Court, therefore, revision was filed, however, on the objection of the respondents, counsel for the petitioners minutely examined the position and found that the order is appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, referred to as the "Code"). Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that the judgment in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) has not laid down the correct law and single Bench has not considered the previous judgments on the point. In support of his contention, counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment in the case of Reliable Water Supply Service of India v. Union of India (1971 SC 2183). This case relates to dispute under the Arbitration Act. Though the dispute was within the ambit of Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, but the trial Court treated the dispute under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act. Thereafter, against the order passed by the trial Court, Union of India filed an appeal in the High Court. Appeal was contested on various grounds and one of the grounds was that appeal was not maintainable. High Court accepted the contention and converted the appeal into revision under Section 115 of the Code and decided the case exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Thereafter, objection was raised that appeal could not be converted into revision. It is held in this case that the High Court was right in converting the appeal into revision.

Counsel for the petitioners submitted this Court has taken; a view that even the revision can be heard :as an appeal or appeal can be heard as a revision and relied upon the judgments in the cases of Gauri Shankar v. Firm Dulichand Laxminarayan MANU/MP/0059/1959. Similar view was taken in the case of Rashid Khatoon v. Abdul Rashid Khan MANU/MP/0171/1966 : (1969 MPLJ 587) and Sir Madhaorao Ganesh Deshpande v. Keshao Gajanan Huddar (AIR 1941 Nag 304). Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the law laid down in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) has not considered the previous judgments of this Court and is against the settled principles of law laid down by this Court and the judgment does not lay down the correct law. He prayed that the application for conversion of the revision into appeal be allowed.

Shri D. D. Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the application and submitted that there is distinction between the appeal and the revision. In support of his contention, he referred to the judgments in the cases of Ram Avtar v. Ram Dhani (MANU/SC/0034/1997 : AIR 1997 SC 107) : (1997 All LJ 1908), Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh MANU/SC/0265/1964 and Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal (AIR 1963 SC 698). He further submitted that nature and scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction is different from the appellate jurisdiction and placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of (MANU/SC/0285/1985 : (1986) 1 SCC 512) : (AIR 1986 SC 446). Counsel for the respondents then referred to the judgment in the case of Chittaranjan Crochet (P) Ltd. v. Lakshmoni Dass (Smt) and submitted that if a parry had any doubt then the party could file appeal as well as revision. He submitted that if the order impugned is revisable, it cannot be converted into an appeal as, there is no presentation of appeal in the eyes of law. Revision as filed itself was not maintainable, therefore, revision which was not maintainable and was bad at its initial filing cannot be converted into an appeal. The powers should not be exercised liberally to convert the revision into appeal. In support of his contention, he referred to the judgment in the case of Munshi Singh v. Tula Ram (1980 MPLJ SN 61). He referred to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of T.K. Ramanujam Pillai v. Subramaniam (MANU/TN/0299/1967 : AIR 1967 Mad 298) wherein it is held that second appeal could not be converted into revision in exercise of discretion. He submitted that if the revision is not maintainable, petitioner can file appeal explaining the delay by filing an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act alongwith memo of appeal. In support of his contention, he referred to the judgment in the case of Rakesh Shyamlal Samaiya v. Ajay Kumar Babulal Jain MANU/MP/0662/2000 : (2000 (3) MPLJ 484). However, he referred to the judgment in the case of Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Brothers (MANU/SC/0520/1998 : (1998) 6 SCC 748) : (AIR 1998 SC 2730) wherein in para 7 of the judgment, it is held that against the order of eviction, appeal under Section 96 of the Code was maintainable and second appeal under Section 100 of the Code was maintainable. It is held that against the judgment, revision was not maintainable and the remedy was by way of second appeal alone. High Court entertained the revision and allowed the case in the absence of objection against maintainability of revision petition. Apex Court held that "to meet the ends of justice if the revision is to be treated as second appeal under Section 100, CPC, then requirement of existence of substantial questions of law must be satisfied." It is held that if the revision is converted into second appeal, then requirement of substantial question of law must be satisfied, otherwise, revision cannot be converted into second appeal.

Counsel for the respondents then submitted that once the revision is held to be not maintainable then petitioners are free to prefer an appeal and explain the delay in filing the appeal by moving an appropriate application under the Limitation Act. He referred to the judgment in the case of Rakesh Shyamlal Samaiya (supra). He submitted that in the light of the provisions of Section 104 and Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order impugned is appealable and revision as filed is not maintainable and it cannot be converted into an appeal.

We have considered the arguments of both the parties. It may be mentioned that this Court was suo motu converting revision into appeal and appeal into revision while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. This view was taken in the cases of Gauri Shankar, Rashid Khatoon and Shivkumar (supra). With regard to discretion of the Court in converting appeal into revision, Bombay High Court in the case of U.D. Patel and Company v. C.M. Milligam and Clarke Ltd., AIR 1956 Bombay 598 has held that appeal can be treated as an application for revision. Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Ram Ran Vijay Prashad v. Kishun Singh MANU/BH/0082/1943, has held that revision under Section 115 of the Code was not maintainable against the order which was appealable. In this case, an appeal preferred in a case in which no appeal lay was treated as an application under revision as the question argued was one of the jurisdiction and the Full Bench held that the memorandum of appeal may be treated as a revision as the question relating to jurisdiction is involved in the case.

Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Banka Behari Deb v. Birendra Nath Datta MANU/WB/0290/1927 has held that where no appeal lies from an order, memorandum of appeal can be treated as an application for revision. Where revision has wrongly been preferred it has been permitted to be converted into appeal in the case of Shivkumar (supra). Bombay High Court in the case of Rupam Pictures v. Dr. Brijmohan AIR 1977 Bombay 425 has held that when revision was wrongly preferred, revision was permitted to be converted into an appeal against the order. It is held that in case where appeal lies but revision application is wrongly preferred, the Court has wide discretion to treat it as an appeal if conditions laid down by the law are fully satisfied.

In the case of Bahori v. Vidya Ram MANU/UP/0076/1978, it is held that if revision is filed within limitation prescribed for appeal, then prayer for converting revision into appeal after expiry of period of limitation is maintainable. It is held that there is no specific provision for conversion of an appeal into a revision or vice versa. Consequently, the exercise of power has to be only under the provisions of Section 151 of the Code. The inherent powers of the Court permit the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. The power is undoubtedly discretionary and is to be exercised in a proper case. If the interest of justice requires the passing of such an order or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court, the Court would be fully justified in passing an order under this provision. It is further held that there is nothing like a period of limitation for making an application for conversion of an appeals into revision or vice versa. All that is required to be seen is if the appeal or the revision had been filed within the time prescribed for the filing of the appeal, or the revision, as the case may be. Even otherwise, there would be very few cases, were the conversion would be sought before the expiry of the period of filing the appeal. In most cases, the point would emanate after an objection had been filed or made by the other side. It would undoubtedly be open to the Court considering the question of conversion to satisfy itself that the prayer was bone fide and that there was no unusual delay.

In the case of Narmadabai Narayanshet v. Hidayatalli Saheballi (AIR 1949 Bombay 115), Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) has held that considering the question of conversion of appeal into revision, second appeal before the High Court was not maintainable and it was allowed to be converted into revision after preliminary objection was raised that the suit was cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes no second appeal would have been competent against the said decree since the amount or subject matter of the original suit did not exceed Rs. 500/-. Expression "Suit" used in Section 102 of the Code includes execution proceedings with the result that if the suit is of the nature described in Section 102, no second appeal would lie from an order made in execution of the decree passed in such a suit unless the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 500/-. The test in such cases is not the nature of the proceedings in execution, but the nature of the suit in which the decree sought to be executed was passed. That being so, the preliminary objection is, I think, well founded and must be accepted. Prayer was made by counsel for the petitioner that in view of the importance of the question of law which is being raised in the appeal, he should be permitted to convert his second appeal into a revisional application. It is clear that question of Jaw which arises for decision in these proceedings is of considerable importance, and I think it would not be improper to deal with the said point after allowing the appellant to concert his second appeal into a revisional application.

In the case of Bar Council of India New Delhi v. Manikan Tiwari (AIR 1983 All 357) against an order allowing the petition for review on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of record, appeal was preferred it was held not maintainable but it is held that the appeal could be treated as revision. It was held that rejecting the appeal on the ground of maintainability would mean to call upon the appellant to challenge the impugned order by means of a revision and this will not serve any purpose and the Court permitted the appeal to be converted into a revision.

Single Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of N. Karuppan v. M. Sankaran Nair (AIR 1973 Kerala 28) has held that conditional order under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC is not appealable and appeal lies from a final order. It is held that appeal filed when no appeal lay, appeal when technically incompetent, can be treated as a revision and delay can be condoned. Similar view was taken by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Narendra Kumar v. Shrimati Suraj Mehta MANU/AP/0174/1982. While considering the amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, it is held that no appeal lay against an order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, since the order is an interim order, High Court can treat the appeal as revision invoking powers under Section 115 of the Code.

In the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise MANU/SC/0187/1998 : (1998) 3 SCC 540 : AIR 1998 SC 1270 appeal was filed by an aggrieved party in the Apex Court under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. A preliminary objection was raised by the Revenue that no such appeal was maintainable. Though the Supreme Court upheld the objection, it did not dismiss the matter and observed (at page 1273 of AIR) :

"We are not disposed to dismiss this appeal on that technical ground at this stage because the appellant could in that situation have sought for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. With all the papers available for deciding the question involved in this appeal, we do not think it proper to drive the appellant to file another special leave petition for that purpose, particularly because of the lapse of almost nine years since the filing of this appeal. We, therefore, treat this appeal as one filed by special leave."
After the 1977 amendment in Section 102 of the Code it is held that if second appeal is filed by the party aggrieved against the decision rendered by the first appellate Court, in appropriate cases, on objection being raised, the High Court may, in its discretion, allow conversion of second appeal into revision. This view has been taken by the Orissa High Court in the case of Loknath Maharana v. Dr. A.B. Mohantil MANU/OR/0057/1977.

However, in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) it is held that in view of the amendment in Section 102 of the Code, second appeal was not maintainable being the suit valued less than Rs. 25000/-. Though the appeal was filed before 1-7-2002, it is held that second appeal was not maintainable. Further it is held that appeal cannot be converted into revision as the scope of both the sections is different. It may be mentioned that the Apex Court while considering the question of conversion of revision into second appeal has considered the question that revision can be converted into second appeal, if substantial question of law arise in the case. However, while converting appeal into revision, question of substantial question of law will not arise. It is true I that scope of appeal and revision is different, but the Courts have been permitting conversion of appeal into revision and revision into appeal. Therefore, rigid view that appeal cannot be converted into revision or vice versa will not be in the interest of justice. A litigant cannot be penalised on account of technical error or mistake committed by the counsel. To meet the ends of justice, revision can be converted into appeal or appeal can be converted into revision while exercising the discretion and if the following norms are fulfilled, then normally order of conversion of revision in to appeal or appeal into revision should be passed :

(i) When revision is converted into second appeal, then before passing the order of conversion, it is to be considered whether substantial question of law arises in the said case, if no substantial question of law arises in the case, revision cannot be converted into second appeal.
(ii) Revision can be converted into appeal if same is filed within time and there is no impediment of limitation. Limitation must be construed from the date of filing of the revision petition or appeal. If the revision or appeal so filed was within limitation, for conversion into appeal or revision, it is to be examined that the appeal or revision, as the case may be, so filed, on the date of institution, was within the limitation and if so, said permission can be granted.

(iii) There is no period of limitation for applying such conversion, but while exercising the powers of conversion, the Court would keep in mind whether appeal or revision, as the case may be, had been instituted within the period prescribed for such proceedings.

We are of the considered opinion that in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) correct law has not been laid down. In this judgment, previous judgments on the point and settled position of law of this Court has not been considered. Ignoring the principle of "stare decisis" settled practise has been unsettled without considering previous judgments. We have considered the earlier views of this Court and the judgments of other High Courts and that of the Apex Court and we hold that in this case, revision can be converted into miscellaneous appeal. Application LA. 3963/03 is allowed and the office is directed to register this revision as miscellaneous appeal and list before appropriate Bench.

Reference is answered accordingly.

Whether The Court Can Execute Injunction Decree Against Some of The Judgment Debtors if One of The JD is Dead

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